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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED:
i.

Preponderance o£ the evidence as the correct standard:

Whether the general standard of proof required in civil actions,
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, is the correct standard
to establish the existence of a common law marriage pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995)?
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review.

This issue was

preserved in the trial court in Mr. Hansen's Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

Record at 325. The trial court's

conclusions of law should not be provided any particular
deference and should be reviewed for correctness.

The Court of

Appeals is free to render its own independent interpretations of
legislative intent and statutory applications on matters of law.
Steele v. Breinholt, 747 p.2d 433, 434-35 (Utah ct. App. 1987).

2. Violation of the Utah Constitution: Whether a statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1995), which requires a
determination of a common law marriage within one year of the
1

termination of the relationship violates Article 1, Sections 7,
11, and 24 of the Utah Constitution?
Issue Preservation and Standard of Review.

This issue was

preserved in the trial court in Mr. Hansen's Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

Record at 321.

The trial court's

conclusions of law should not be provided any particular
deference and should be reviewed for correctness.

The Court of

Appeals is free to render its own independent interpretations of
legislative intent and statutory applications on matters of law.
Steele v. Breinholt. 747 P.2d 433, 434-35 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL
Section 30-1-4.5, Utah Code Ann. (1995) is determinative on
appeal and is set forth in the Addendum to this brief.

Articles

7, 11, and 24 of the Utah Constitution are also determinative on
appeal and are set forth in the Addendum to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order signed and dated the 8th of
May, 1997.

Record at 350.
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below

Mr. Hansen filed a complaint on October 12, -1995. Mr.
2

Hansen's cause of action was for a determination of a common law
marriage between Michael Hansen and Laura Hansen.

The court

dismissed Mr. Hansen's Complaint December 20, 1996.

The court

ruled that the burden of proof for a determination of the
existence of a common law marriage is clear and convincing
evidence and that Mr. Hansen had not met this standard.

Mr.

Hansen moved on the 18th of February to alter or amend the
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The district

court denied the Motion to Amend, concluding that the correct
burden of proof is proof by clear and convincing evidence. Mr.
Hansen appeals the district court's order.

Statement of Facts
1.

The parties were previously married for a period of

approximately nine years. Their divorce was final in March 1994.
Record at 246-247.
2.

In October 1994, Mr. Hansen moved back into the marital

home with Mrs. Hansen and resided there with her and their
children until at least May 1995.
3.

Record at 246.

From May 1995 through September 22, 1995, Mr. Hansen

did not live at the marital home nor cohabit with her.

Record at

246.
4.

Judge Hansen previously made a finding in a protective

order action between the parties that Mr. Hansen lived in the
marital home again from September 22, 1995, through December 27,
1995 at the request of Mrs. Hansen.
3

Record at 246.

5.

During the periods of cohabitation Mr. Hansen routinely

turned over his paycheck to Mrs. Hansen and then received back
some cash as "walking around money."
6.

Record at 246.

During the periods of cohabitation Mrs. Hansen worked

and pooled her money with the money that she received from Mr.
Hansen.
7.

Record at 246.
Mrs. Hansen used the money she and Mr. Hansen earned to

pay a credit card debt Mr. Hansen had incurred during the period
of separation preceding their divorce.

She also used this pooled

money to pay the home mortgage, to pay family living expenses and
obligations and to pay her own debts.
8.

During the period of cohabitation the parties acted

much like a family.
9.

Record at 246.

Record at 246.

When the parties' son was of age to be baptized into

the L.D.S. church, the parties met with the local Bishop to
arrange for the son's baptism.

Neither party dispelled the

appearance that they were a family.
10.

Record at 246.

After Mr. Hansen moved back in with Mrs. Hansen, a

membership clerk from the L.D.S. church came to inquire
concerning Mr. Hansen's church membership records and was told
that Mr. Hansen lived in the marital home.
that they were back together.
11.

The appearance was

Record at 245-46.

Mrs. Hansen used Mr. Hansen's medical and dental

insurance to cover the cost of some of her medical treatments.
The coverage was only available to her as a wife and she claimed
4

the benefit of this coverage.
12.

Record at 245.

During the time the parties cohabited Mrs. Hansen held

herself out as Mr. Hansen's wife to the insurance carrier.
Record at 245.
13.

During the period of cohabitation Mrs. Hansen

frequently wore a ring on the finger of her left hand,
traditionally viewed as her marriage finger.
14.

Record at 245.

During the time the parties cohabited each was capable

of giving consent to a marriage and each was legally capable of
entering into a solemnized marriage.
15.

Record at 245.

During the time the parties cohabited they each assumed

marital rights, duties, and obligations.
16.

Record at 245.

Mr. Hansen filed the Complaint of this matter, on or

about the 12th of October, 1995, requesting a determination of
the existence of a common law marriage between the parties. The
Complaint was filed within one year of the termination of the
Hansen's relationship.
17.

Record at 4.

On the 2Qth of December, 1996; also within one year of

the termination of the relationship, the court dismissed the
Complaint for determination of a common law marriage.

The court

found that Mr. Hansen had failed to prove by "clear and
convincing" evidence either that Mrs. Hansen consented to a
marital relationship or that the parties acquired a general
reputation as husband and wife.
18.

Record at 247.

On the 18th of February, 1997 r Mr. Hansen made a Motion
5

to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Record at 316.
19.

In an Order signed the 8th of May. 1997, the court

denied Mr. Hansen's Motion to Amend.

The court concluded as a

matter of law that the standard of proof for the existence of a
common law marriage is by clear and convincing evidence.

Record

at 350.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The correct burden of proof to determine the existence of a
common law marriage is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the general burden of
proof in civil matters.

This burden has been adopted by a

majority of Utah's sister states that recognize common law
marriage.

Public policy favors proof by a preponderance of the

evidence for determining the existence of a common law marriage.
The Utah statute authorizing common law marriage is
unconstitutional under Article 1, Sections 7, 11, and 24 of the
Utah Constitution.

The statute requires that the establishment

of such a marriage be made within one year of the termination of
the relationship.

If the district court were to be reversed, the

statute would deprive Mr. Hansen of due process, uniform
operation of the laws, and his right to open courts because his
rights would be extinguished by the one-year statute of
limitations.
6

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The statute in question in this case is Section 30-1-4.5,
Utah Code Annotated (1995). This section provides:
(1)

A marriage which is not solemnized according to
this chapter shall be legal if a court or
administrative order establishes that it arises
out of a contract between two consenting parties
who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a
solemnized marriage under the provision of
this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties,
and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have
acquired a uniform and general reputation as
husband and wife.

(2)

The determination or establishment of a marriage
under this section must occur during the
relationship described in Subsection (1), or
within one year following the termination of that
relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable
under this section may be manifested in any form,
and may fre proved under the Sflme general rules Qf
evidence as facts in other cases.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995)(emphasis added).
If a court finds that a marriage arose out of a contract
between two consenting parties who meet the above requirements,
then in the eyes of the law, they are married.
The following arguments address the findings and conclusions
reached by the district court in the present case.

7

The arguments

point out why the court incorrectly found the burden of proof for
determining the existence of a common law marriage to be clear
and convincing evidence, and why the statute authorizing common
law marriage violates the Utah Constitution.

POINT I.
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AS THE CORRECT STANDARD: THE
GENERAL STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL ACTIONS, PROOF BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, IS THE CORRECT STANDARD TO
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE.
ZL.

The general standard of proof in civil actions is proof bv a

preponderance of the evidence.
The district court concluded that the correct burden of
proof for determining the existence of a common law marriage is
proof by clear and convincing evidence.

Record at 35 0.

Although the language in Section 30-1-4.5(2) does not
articulate the exact standard of proof required, it does require
evidence be proved under "the same general rules of evidence as
facts in other cases."

According to the Utah Supreme Court, the

general rules of evidence in Utah civil cases dictate that
evidence be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. In Johns
v. Shulsen. the Supreme Court explained,

xx

[i]t is universally

recognized that the standard of proof required in civil actions
is by a preponderance of the evidence."

717 P.2d 1336, 1338

(Utah 1986) (citing Morris v. Farmer's Home Ins. Co.. 500 P.2d
505 (Utah 1972)).
8

•

i. - .

: • =

-

- • -

. ^ . y

interpret the m e a n i n g of S e c t i o n j0-i--*.5 'o a p p l y a
p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e e v i d e n c e standard
--:_•£-:;-,.

..

sucn corrr.rv;;. : :

*-h^ M o n t a n a Supreme Court

.

._:. d e t e r m i n i n g that

carriages a r e to b e p r o v e n by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of

the e v i d e n c e . 1

v

In Miller

Townsend Lumber

V

:

•--•?—-

!! Ifiu M o n t a n a Supreme Coui . . ::erred to die M o n t a n a
state common l a w m a r r i a g e statute containing s i m i l a r language to
U t a h ' s S e c t i o n 30-i- ' '

•'' ^ , | )'-n<^>

•

>t ,i

a

m a r r i a g e "may b e m a n i f e s t e d ±n any form. a:.u m a y u e proved u n d e r
the Liame general r u l e s of evidence as facts in o t h e r ^ase?

" Id.

identical to m e l a n g u a g e founc in U t a h ' s s t a t u t e , t h e M o n t a n a
Supreme Court w^n*- ^ •-o apply.-3t.a:M^:

•:

marriage..

: -'

p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e evidence
:- - A i s t e n c e of a c o m m o n law

j£L at 15 2.

Based ~vi
i.

•••.:;

:j

. .

he ]nr : ai:i^ ~*.f q e c — ----- "-"

_L*L-

••-}

;

generaJ. IUI-CL; 01 cv^jciiCG d.s J. n ctiier c a s e s , and

based en the standard of proof required in Utah civil a c t i o n s ,
the Court should h a v e a p p 1
1

.-• \

i ^

.-J-.:-.

The Utah statute reads; "Evidence of a marriage
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any fuim,
and may be proved under the same general rules of evidence as
facts in other cases." Utah Code Ann. § 30 1-4.5(2) (1995). The
Montana statute reads: "Consent to and consummation of marriage
nay be manifested in any form, and may be proved,under the same
general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. Cited in
Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co.. 448 P. 2d 148, 1.51 (I^onf , Q ^ i

standard.
ILu

A majority of sister states which recognize common law

marriage require proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
While Utah's own statutes and cases have already outlined
the appropriate burden of proof, the district court in the
instant case relied on a survey of the law of sister states to
determine the burden of proof necessary to establish a valid
common law marriage.

The district court's survey, however, was

flawed.
The district court found fourteen jurisdictions which have
adopted a clear and convincing standard and nine jurisdictions
which have adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Record at 241.

However, there are only fifteen jurisdictions,

including Utah, which recognize common law marriage, and only six
of these states, including Utah, recognize common law marriage by
statute.2

In its survey, the district court cited court

decisions in states which have either abolished common law
2

Six states have statutes recognizing common law marriage,
Montana, Texas, South Carolina, Idaho, Georgia and Utah. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-403 (1995); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91
(Vernon, 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-360 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 32201 (1996)(recognizing marriages contracted before January 1,
1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1 (1996)(recognizing marriages
contracted before January 1, 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5
(1995). Ten other jurisdictions judicially recognize common law
marriage as part of the state's general common law. See Record
at 241 (citing cases for Alabama, Oklahoma, Colorado, Iowa,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, District of Columbia, and South
Dakota); Driscoll v. Driscoll. 552 P.2d 629, 632 -(Kan. 1976)
(applying Kansas law).
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£L' Public policy favors establishing a common law marriage
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I n coi 3 c::J iidi ng as a matter

. - aw that ^ubi _, policy favored

the establishment of common law marriages bv clear and convincing
e v i d e n c e, t: h e d i s t r i z t: • :: ::: i :
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to

other civil judicial proceedings.

The court stated that while

most civil claims need only be proved by a preponderance, there
are some exceptions:
[T]he clear and convincing standard has been applied in
the following types of civil proceedings, among others:
civil commitment; termination of parental rights; civil
contempt; denaturalization, and deportation. A common
element in these civil proceedings is the presence of
contested individual interest deemed worthy of extra
protection.
Record at 238(citations omitted).
In comparing common law marriage to the judicial proceedings
it listed, the district court found a common element of a
"contested individual interest deemed worthy of extra
protection," which justified a higher burden of proof.

However,

the proceedings that the district court compared common law
marriage to are clearly distinguishable.
The first civil proceeding to which the court compared
common law marriage, civil commitment, demands the clear and
convincing standard only because it is written into the statute.
See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-234 (10) (1997) ("The court shall order
commitment of an individual... if... the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that....").
Likewise, the termination of parental rights is governed by
a statute defining the burden of proof as clear and convincing
evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-406(3) (1996) ("The court
shall in all cases require the petitioner to establish the facts
by clear and convincing evidence...").
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Likewise, deportation is also distinguishable from common
law marriage.

The United States Supreme Court has required a

higher burden of proof in deportation matters because u[t]he
immediate hardship of deportation is often greater than that
inflicted by denaturalization, which does not, immediately at
least, result in expulsion from our shores."
Immigration Service 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).

Woodby v.
Deportation forces

the defendant to uforsake all the bonds formed here and go to a
foreign land." Id. at 285. The finding of a common law marriage
does not inflict the hardship envisioned by the Supreme Court
when it required the clear and convincing standard for
deportation.

There, the heightened protection is warranted

because of the heightened danger and hardships that can result
from such proceedings.

When that heightened danger is lacking,

such as the case with common law marriage, public policy does not
demand a higher standard of proof than the general standard of
proof required in other civil matters.
Because the standard of proof required in the proceedings
cited by the district court are either defined by statute, by the
United States Supreme Court, or seen by the courts as "quasicriminal" in nature, the proceedings cited by the district court
are incorrect comparisons to common law marriage.

Public policy

does not require a higher standard of proof than the
preponderance standard that governs other civil cases.
The Hansens were once formally married.
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They^then divorced,
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ruling saying that it
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'hoIds that the evidence in such cases may
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be less than the positive and convincing proof necessary to
establish a common law marriage."

Ward v. Terriere, 3 86 P. 2d

352, 355 (Colo. 1963).
While it may be argued that common law marriage is
disfavored in some states, in Utah the Legislature chose to
recognize common law marriages in 1987.

This recent recognition

of common law marriages evidenced a shift in the light by which
such marriages are to be seen.
The language of the statute points the courts to the proper
burden of proof required to show the existence of a common law
marriage.

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the

general burden of proof in civil matters and has been adopted by
a majority of Utah's sister states that recognize common law
marriage.
POINT II.
VIOLATION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION; UTAH CODE 1953 SECTION 30-14.5(2), WHICH REQUIRES A DETERMINATION OF A COMMON LAW WITHIN ONE
YEAR OF THE TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP VIOLATES ARTICLE 1,
SECTIONS 7, 11, AND 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
A^.
Section 30-1-4.5(2) violates f.hft due process clause of
Article 1. section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Section 30-1-4.5(2) provides

xv

[t]he determination or

establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during
the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year
following the termination of that relationship.. . . " (Emphasis
added).
16

Ti

I Ill .a .1 Coiii: t

: il: i \ ppeal s i las i i<: Dted 1 .1 2 potei it ::i a 1

constiLuiional problems with Section. 30-1 4.5

The court stated:

We do note, however, that [Section 30 -1-4.5] might
present a constitutional questioi i i n a different
context. If a trial court were to enter a judgement
denying a common-law marriage within one year of
separation, and that judgement were reversed on appeal
and the matter remanded, the parties might be denied a
reasonable opportunity to comply with the plain meaning
of the statute.

Bunch v. Englehori.

—

-^p. 1995) .

As noted bv the district court., the present case presents
:
in the Addendum -

ihis brief

...

s set for th

record at ^39.

The Bunch ~~-urt recognd zed that the p ] a :i n mean i i lg of t:l I =
statute is that the determination, not. simply a filing, must De
made within one year of the • ^rmination of the relationship..
Bund.

Trr
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by filing her complaint within one year of
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separation.

:ie parties'
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Under tne p a i n meaning of the

statute, Bunch d i a -, nr nbtain a timely determination ^f her
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within

this context that the Court of Appeals noted the potential
constitutional

problems.

Should Mr. Hansen obtain a favorable result on appeal, the
statute would effect ivelv ^ r r ^ r p Mr. Hansen of a remedy since
til le deter i ..*

.

,. _ *_ „

; nin one year,.
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It io possible

for him to prevail on appeal, reverse the trial court, and still
lose the right to assert his claim.
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states, "[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."

Utah Const. Art 1 § 7 (1896).

The district court ruled that Mr. Hansen's constitutional
challenge was premature because the appellate court had not yet
reversed the trial court.

Record at 338.

However, by the time

the trial court would find the constitutional issue relevant, Mr.
Hansen would have already been deprived of his rights.
Mr. Hansen has standing to immediately challenge the
constitutionality of the statute even though it has not yet been
applied to his detriment.

Parties may challenge the validity of

a statute if their interests have been or are "about to be
prejudiced by the operation of the statute."

Cavaness v. Cox.

598 P.2d 349, 352 (Utah 1979) (citation omitted) . Should this
court reverse the district court, it may rule that Mr. Hansen's
interests are "about to be prejudiced" because it will be
impossible for him to comply with the statute.

The impending

prejudice gives Mr. Hansen standing to challenge the statute.
Under a literal reading of the statute as interpreted by the
court in Bunchr the only way to comply with the statute's oneyear expiration clause would be to both file within one year of
the termination and prevail at the district court level.

If the

party must appeal, regardless of a subsequent reversal, it will
18

a party must. .;^it tor tne c o u n of appeals ro reverse, there is
little chance of compliance with the statute.
Mr

Hansen's rights ought not be determined by the tact that

trial and appellate courts have very busy schedules.

See, e.g.

E11 i S^L>—aocial jaejsdLcss-Jiesi^ oL Church-a L - Jesus Chris.L-of.
Latter-Day Saints. 615 P.2d i250, 1256 (Utah 1980) (noting that
when it is impossible to con:
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of the party, uue process requires chat her
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permittee \ >u
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that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity -n comply)-

application or statute to invalidate father's acknowledgment of
paternity would vioiatp h:.

••-r-

.
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;.]-->

have reasonable opportunity \o comply witn the statute, despite
his fail ure to timely file an affidavit acknowledging patern: L^ , .
Be

;...*•

;-.. .

O-.L. ,

chance Lu comply

with Section 50-1-4.5 12) as a result of the practical
impossibiiit

- " ^

statute violator

LIIC

---*•

the

Due Process clause oi tlie Utah Const itut ion.

BL.
Section 30-1-4.5(2) violates the open courts provision of
Article 1. section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
Se

.

'nnsti tution states:

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of Jaw,
which shall be administered without denial or
19

unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
state, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
Utah Const. Art 1 § 11 (1896).
The analytical framework under which section 11 challenges
are examined is a two step process.

A court determines first,

whether a statute removing an existing remedy provides an
"effective and reasonable alternative remedy," and second, if no
alternative remedy is provided, whether the statute eliminates a
"clear social or economic evil" through means which are not
unreasonable or arbitrary.

See Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech

Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985); Condemarin v.
University Hosp.. 775 P.2d 348, 358 (Utah 1989).
The first prong of the test demands a reasonable alternative
remedy because an attempt to "bar the existing rights of
claimants without affording this opportunity [to try rights in
the courts]...would not be a statute of limitations, but an
unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might
be the purport of its provisions."

Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d

1357, 1365 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(citations omitted).
If there is no substitute remedy, as in the case of section
30-1-4.5(2), the statute must be justified by its elimination of
a clear economic or social evil through a reasonable and nonarbitrary means.

Berry, 717 P.2d at 680.

In this case, there is no alternative remedy provided by the
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statute once a party has failed to meet the one-year provision.
The question is then one of deterring clear social or economic
evil.
By restricting common law marriages to those which can be
proven before a court within one year of termination of the
relationship, the legislature has not deterred any clear social
or economic evil.

The statute also does away with the rights of

a party seeking to establish a common law marriage through
unreasonable and arbitrary means.
This type of statute is what the court in Condemarin had in
mind when it said:
Legislative, attempts to abrogate [the special class of
protected rights under article I, section 11] should be
closely examined and struck down when the disability
they seek to impose on individual rights is too great
to be justified or when the legislation is an arbitrary
and impermissible shifting of collective burdens to
individual citizens.
Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 358.
£L.
Section 30-1-4.5(2) violates the uniform operation provision
of Article 1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that

xx

laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.'7

[a] 11
Utah

Const. Art 1 § 24 (1896).
When evaluating a legislative measure under Section 24, a
court must determine whether the classification is reasonable,
whether the objectives of the legislature are legitimate, and
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the
21

classification and the legislative purposes.

Blue Cross & Blue

Shield of Utah v. Static 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989).
The practical effect of 30-1-4.5(2) is to limit those
parties who may prove the existence of a common law marriage.

As

previously noted, the only means by which one may comply with the
statute is to file a Complaint within one year of the termination
of the relationship and prevail at the trial court level, and
complete all administrative requirements to have the judgement
entered by the court.
If the party must appeal, there is little chance of
complying with the one-year restriction of the statute.

These

parties are without remedy and are unreasonably classified
differently from those who may prevail at the trial court.

This

unreasonable classification violates Section 24 as interpreted by
Blue Cross. 779 P.2d at 637.
CONCLUSION
The inquiry into the existence of a common law marriage is
made under Section 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code. The legislature did
not explicitly express the burden of proof required beyond
stating that the evidence should be proved "under the same
general rules of evidence as facts in other cases."
Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1995).

Utah Code

Those general rules include the

general burden of proof in civil matters, proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. When read literally, the statute

22

itself provides the burden of proof necessary.

The district

court incorrectly applied the higher standard of clear and
convincing evidence.

This Court should reverse and restate the

correct burden of proof for determining the existence of a common
law marriage under Utah law: proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Beyond a literal reading of the statute, a survey of sister
states with similar common law marriage statutes to Utah's
statute shows that the weight of judicial authority is that proof
by a preponderance of the evidence is the correct standard.
The statute itself is unconstitutional when the facts of
this case are applied to its provisions.

As the district court

noted, the hypothetical constitutional problems envisioned by the
court in Bunch v. Englehorn. 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1995),
are realized in the present case.

If the district court is

reversed, Mr. Hansen will be deprived of due process because of
his inability to comply with the one-year requirement of the
statute.

Mr. Hansen will also be deprived of his rights under

the open courts provision in Section 11 of the Utah Constitution
because there is no reasonable alternative remedy provided and
the statute fails to eliminate a clear social or economic evil
through means that are not unreasonable or arbitrary.

Through an

unreasonable classification of those that are unable to comply
with the one-year provision, Section 30-1-4.5(2) violates the
uniform operation clause of the Utah Constitution.
23

Accordingly, it is requested that the Court rule on all
issues presented and hold as a matter of law that the correct
standard required to establish a common law marriage is proof by
a preponderance of the evidence.

In addition, this Court may

declare Section 30-1-4.5(2) unconstitutional.
Dated this

o

day of August, 1997.

Brent D. Ypungc
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

Section 30-1-4.5 Utah Code Ann. (1995)
Utah Constitution Art 1 § 7 (1896)
Utah Constitution Art 1 § 11 (1896)
Utah Constitution Art 1 § 24 (1896)
Ruling, December 20, 1996 (Record at 229-247)
Ruling, April 14, 1997 (Record at 337-339)

Bunch y, Bnglehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah ct. App. 1995)
Miller v, TQwnsend Lumber Co., 448 P.2d 148 (Mont.
1968)
Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs. 590 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. 1979)
In re Peterson's Estate. 365 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1961)

I

A.

Section 30-1-4.5 Utah Code Ann. (1995)

30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative
crcier establishes that it arises out of a contract between two
consenting parties who:
(aj are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this chapter;
(c* have cohabited:
(d mutually assume maritai rights, duties, and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship described
in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination
of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable
under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in
other cases.
1987

B.

Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n Art 1 § 7 (1896)

Art. I, § 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.: 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus $ 5.
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A.L.R.3d 301.
Constitutional Law
Key Numbers.
83(1), 121 to 123.

Sec- 6- [Right to b e a r arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const. 1896: L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2. proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3. Laws 1984 (2nd S . S J . § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2.

A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law s=» 82;
Weapons ®=» 1. 3, 6 et seq.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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C.

Utah Constitution Art 1 § 11 (1896)

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Art. I, § 11

sion of operator's license for "habitual/' "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial. 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51
A.L.R.4th 565.
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory
discharge from employment. 52 A.L.R.4th
1141.
Right to jury trial in state court divorce proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.
Jury trial rights in, and on appeal from,
small claims court proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th
1119.
Key N u m b e r s . — Jury <s=> 9 et seq.

Utah State Constitution, 1986 U t a h L. Rev.
319.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 177.
Am, J U T . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d J u r y § 7 et
sea..
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries § 9 et seq.
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or similar offense, right to trial by jury in criminal
prosecution for, 16 A.L.R.3d 1373.
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counterclaim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321.
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393.
Automobiles: validity and construction of
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be' administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
History: Const. 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Actions by court.
Actions by state.
Actions not created.
Arbitration Act.
Assignments.
Attorneys' duties.
Criminal law.
—Suspension of execution of death sentence.
Debt collection.
District court jurisdiction.
Election contest.
Forum non conveniens.
Injury or damage to property.
Intoxicating liquor.
Land Registration Act.
Limitations.
—Limitations of actions.
—Statutory limitation of review. .
Occupational disease law.
Sovereign immunity.
Torts.
—Action by wife against husband.
—Loss of consortium.
Unlicensed law practice.
Waiver of rights.
Workmen's compensation law.
Cited.

Action u n d e r Civil R i g h t s Act of 1871.
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. 1981 et
seq., is vested originally in the federal courts,
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by
state courts is not thereby prohibited; in view
of the provisions of this section, therefore, it
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d
625 (Utah 1977).
Trial court would not err in dismissing action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the
ground of forum non conveniens in a proper
case, but such dismissal should be without
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his
suit to another forum without harm to his
claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah
1977).
Actions by court.
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open probate proceeding and to proceed against bond of
administratrix where she has practiced extrinsic fraud on the court. Wevant v. Utah Saw &
Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.L.R.
1119 (1919).
Actions by state.
This section did not alter the law with respect to certain rights which are vested in the
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D.

Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n Art 1 § 24 (1896)

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
project did not unconstitutionally grant benefits to private individuals; any benefits were
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-

Art. I, § 24

mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d.
§§ 9 to 23.

Sec. 24.

C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26.
Kev Numbers. — Franchises <$= 11.

36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises

[Uniform operation of laws.]

All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-

vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec.
26.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Age of majority.
Agent for service of process.
Automobile license law.
Construction with Art. VI, § 26.
Contract carrier permit.
Cosmetologists' license law.
Criminal actions.
—Investigations.
—Prosecution.
—Sentence.
Criminal sentence.
Disparate tax assessments.
Excess revenue refuncs.
Guest statutes.
Inheritance Tax Law.
Insurance premium tax exemption.
Intoxicating liquor.
Licenses.
Massage parlor ordinance.
Municipal employment prerequisites.
Notice requirements.
Propert y.
—Responsibility for water service.
Public employees' retirement system.
Public officers' bonds.
Public officers' salaries.
Road poll tax.
School activities.
Search warrants.
Sunday closing laws.
Tax sales.
Unfair Practices Act.
In g e n e r a l .
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever
uniform laws can be enacted. State v.
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563. 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R.
696 (1921).
Objects and purposes of law present touchstone for determining proper and improper

classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78
P.2d 920. 117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. &
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766
(1941).
One who assails legislative classification as
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such.
State v.* J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so
long as there is some basis for differentiation
between classes or subject matters included, as
compared to those excluded, provided differentiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker. Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Before legislative enactment can be interfered with, court must be able to say that there
is no fair reason for the law that would not
require equally its extension to those which it
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc.. 100 Utah 523. 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Only where some persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are, as to the subject matter of the law, in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation, is the law
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis
to differentiate can be found, law must be held
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc., 100 Utah 523. 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Inability of legislature to make perfect classification does not render statute unconstitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc.. 100
Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
In determining whether classification made
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimination is very essence of classification and is not
objectionable unless founded upon- unreasonable distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake Citv,
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948).
An act is never unconstitutional because of
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Ruling, December 20, 1996

(Record at 229-247)

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk
t ^ d i _ j £ i ^ Deputy
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL L. HANSEN,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER: 954402169
DATED: DECEMBER 20, 1996

vs.

RULING

LAURA T. HANSEN,

ANTHONY W. SCHOFTELD, JUDGE

Defendant.

Trial on plaintiffs complaint for determination of a common law marriage was
held October 24, 1996 and was continued on October 26, 1996. At trial the Court also
heard evidence on an order to show cause issued at the request of plaintiff. Brent
Young represented plaintiff Michael Hansen ("Mike"), and Andrew McCullough
represented defendant, Laura Hansen ("Laura"). Closing arguments were heard on
November 27, 1996. Kelly Frye, guardian ad litem, was present and participated in
both proceedings. At issue is whether the parties' relationship constitutes a common
law marriage and contempt allegations claimed by each party against the other.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I find that the following facts have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence:
1.

These parties previously were married for a period of approximately

1

nine years. Their divorce was final in March 1994.
2.

In October 1994 Mike moved back into the former marital home with

Laura and resided there with her and the children of the parties until at least May
1995.
3.

From May 1995 through September 22, 1995 Mike did not live at

Laura's home nor cohabit with her.
4.

Judge Hansen previously made a finding in a protective order action

between these parties that Mike lived in Laura's home at her request from September
22, 1995, through December 27, 1995.
5.

During the periods of cohabitation Mike routinely turned over his

paycheck to Laura and then received back some cash as "walking around money."
6.

During the periods of cohabitation Laura worked and she pooled her

money with the money which she received from Mike.
7.

Laura used the money she and Mike earned to pay the significant credit

card debt which Mike had incurred during the period of separation preceding their
divorce, to pay the home mortgage, to pay family living expenses and obligations and
to pay her debts.
8.

During the period of cohabitation the parties acted much like a family.

9.

When the parties' son was of age to be baptized the parties met with the

local L.D.S. Bishop to arrange for the son's baptism. In the process neither party
dispelled the appearance that they were a family.
10.

After Mike moved back in with Laura the membership clerk from the
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L.D.S. Church came to visit to inquire concerning Mike's church membership records
and was told that Mike lived in the marital home. The appearance was that he and
Laura were back together.
11.

During the periods of cohabitation the parties spent time with several

family friends, including going on trips, like one particular Lake Powell trip. During
all of those trips the parties did not refer to each other as husband or wife.
12.

The friends who knew the parties best believed that the parties were

living together as a couple but not as husband and wife.
13.

During the period of cohabitation Laura had an intimate relationship

with one of these friends, contradicting any notion that she was married to Mike,
although he was living in the marital home.
14.

Laura used Mike's medical and dental insurance to cover the cost of

some of her medical treatments. This insurance coverage was claimed by her as
Mike's wife. The coverage was only available to her as a wife and she claimed the
benefit of that coverage.
15.

During the time the parties cohabited Laura held herself out as Mike's

wife to the insurance carrier.
16.

During the time the parties cohabited each was capable of giving

consent to a marriage and each was legally capable of entering into a solemnized
marriage.
17.

During the time the parties cohabited they each assumed marital rights,

duties and obligations.
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18.

During the period of cohabitation Laura frequently wore a ring on the

finger of her left hand traditionally viewed as her marriage finger.
19.

During the period of cohabitation Laura admitted to Mike that she felt

he had received an inequitable distribution in the divorce. She agreed with him that if
the parties subsequently separated that each would be entitled to one-half of the equity
in the home.
20.

On several occasions during the period of cohabitation Mike told Laura

that he wanted to be married to her and asked her to remarry him. On each of those
occasions Laura declined to enter into a new marriage with Mike.
21.

The parties filed separate tax returns for 1994 and 1995.

22.

The complaint in this case was filed on October 12, 1995, during the

course of the cohabitation and alleged common law marriage of the parties.
23.

Each of the parties have violated terms of one or more orders of the

24.

This Court previously entered a mutual protective order limiting contact

Court.

between the parties and specifically restraining any harassing or threatening behavior.
In defiance of that order Laura has struck Mike and Mike has spit on Laura.
25.

Further, Laura has entered into a pattern of baiting Mike. On one

recent occasion she arranged visitation for Mike. When he came to pick up the
children with a third-party witness they saw the children enter the home but no one
would answer the door when the third party knocked. Mike then went with the third
party to a phone and the friend called Laura. A police officer was on the other end of

4

the phone and he asserted that Mike had violated the protective order Then the
officer found out it was not Mike on the phone This pattern of conduct constitutes
baiting by Laura of Mike in an effort to get him in trouble with the courts for
violating protective orders
26

Laura also has made complaints to law enforcement at times when she

knew that protective orders have been dismissed by the Court.
27

Laura has denied visitation when there has been a clear, detailed,

wntten order setting forth the visitation schedule For example, she denied Mike his
UEA visitation with Zeb
28.

At least some of Laura's denials of visitation to Mike have been made

in response to rulings by the Court that went against Mike.
29.

Almost all of the actions of Mike and Laura in each violating the orders

of the Court, in harassing each other, in involving the police and in fighting and
spitting at each other, have been witnessed by the children. That alone is grounds for
a stem response by the Court as the children have been significantly impacted by the
continual fighting of the parents
ANALYSIS AND RULING
L

COMMON LAW MARRIAGE
EVIDENTIARY BURDEN BORN BY PLAINTIFF.
In cases seeking the determination of a common law marriage I previously

have ruled that the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the existence of the
common law marriage by clear and convincing evidence. As that is the evidentiary

5

standard which I apply m this case, I offer this explananon of the legal analysis for the
use of that evidentiary standard
A.

Background: Common-law marriage generally is disfavored

For nearly a century before the enactment of Utah Code Ann § 30-1-4 5 in
April of 1987, Utah courts consistently refused to validate common-law marriages !
Legal recognition of common-law marriage apparently was precipitated by the
legislature's desire to curb abuse of welfare programs : Thus, one cannot assume that
the State's recognition of common-law marriages reflects approval of them

Such

recognition runs counter to the national trend of abohsning the doctrine 3 Although
Idaho itself continues to recognize common-law marriages, the Idaho Supreme Court,
in Metropolitan Life Ins v Johnson. 645 P 2d 356, 359-60 (Idaho 1982), noted that
common-law marriage increasingly is disfavored in other junsdictions
The trend toward abolition of common law marriage indicates an obvious
hostility to the doctrine That hostility is not confined to those states which do
not recognize common law marriages. The courts of many junsdictions
recognizing the doctnne also view it with disfavor Texas Employers' Ins
Ass'n v Elder. 274 S W 2d 144, 147 (Civ App 1954) ("the law does not favor,
but merely tolerates, common law mamages ") affd 155 Tex 27, 282 S W 2d
371 (1955), In re Redman's Estate. 135 Ohio St 554, 21 NE2d 659, 661
x

See David F Crabtree, Development, Recognition of Common Law Mamages. 149
Utah L Rev 273, 275 (1988) (discussing the legislature's enactment of Utah Code Ann § 301-4 5 )
Id. at 280-81
3

Crabtree, writing in 1988, stated that common-law marnage was then recognized in
the following junsdictions Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and the Distnct of Columbia.
Id at 276 n 15 Since that time, at least one of these junsdictions (Ohio) has abolished the
doctnne See In re Estate of Shepherd. 646 N E 2d 561, 563 (Ohio App d Deist 1994)
(stating that Ohio abolished common-law marnage in 1991)
6

(1939) ("So-called common law marriage contravenes public policy and should
not be accorded any favor; indeed, it is quite generally condemned.,"); Baker
v.Mitchell. 143 Pa. Super. 50, 17 A-2d 738, 741 (1941) ("The law of
Pennsylvania recognizes common law marriages. But they are a fruitful source
of perjury and fraud, and in consequence, they are to be tolerated, not
encouraged")
B.

An apparent majority of jurisdictions require that common-law
marriage claims be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

The distrust with which common-law marriage is viewed in most jurisdictions
finds expression in the higher evidentiary standard many of them in pose on litigants
seeking to prove the existence of such marriages. Research of case law from other
jurisdictions indicates that at least fourteen have adopted a clear and convincing
standard of proof.

Alabama (Crawford v. State. 629 So.2d 745, 748 (Ala. Crim. App.

1993)); Ohio (Mullins v. Mullins. 590 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ohio App. 3d Dist. 1990));
Oklahoma (Mueggenborg v. Walling. 836 P.2d 112, 114 (okla. 1992); Connecticut
(Collier v. City of Milford. 537 A.2d 474, 479 (Conn. 1988)); Rhode Island (Souza v.
O'Hara. 395 A.2d 1060, 1061 n.2 (R.I. 1982)); Michigan (In re Leonard's Estate. 207
N.W.2d 166, 168 (Mich. App. 1973)); Indiana (In re DeWitte's Estate. 222 N.E. 2d
285, 291 (Ind. App. 1966)); Pennsylvania (In re Estate of Miller. 448 A.2d 25, 38
(Penn. Super. Ct. 1982)); Florida (In re Estate of McClenahan. 476 So.2d 1289, 1292
(Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1985, rev, denied. 486 So.2d 597)); Nebraska (Binger v. Binger. 63
N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1954)); South Dakota (Seger v. Erickson. 64 N.W. 2d 316,
318 (S.D. 1954)); New Jersey (In re Jacobsen's Estate. 39 A.2d 704, 707 (N.J. Surr.
Ct. 1994)); Mississippi (Paschall v. Polk. 379 So.2d 316, 317 (Miss. 1980)); and New
York (In re Arbuthonot's Estate. 157 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (Surr. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1956,
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affd. 6 A.2d 1048)).4
By contrast, the same research revealed only nine jurisdictions that have
adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard: Georgia (Arnold v. State. 247 S.E.
2d 207, 208 (Ga. App. 1978)); Texas (Richardson v. State. 744 S.W.2d 65, 73 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987)); South Carolina (Yarborough v. Yarborough. 314 S.E.2d 16, 18-19
(S.C. App. 1984)); Louisiana (Bloom v. Willis. 60 So.2d 415, 417 (La. 1952)); West
Virginia (In re Estate of Foster. 376 S.E.2d 144, 150 (W. Va. 1988)); District of
Columbia (Murphv v. McCloud. 650 A.2d 202, 211-12 (D.C. App. 1994); Montana
(Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co.. 448 P.2d 148, 151 (Mont. 1968)); Arkansas (Brissett
v. Svkes. 855 S.W. 2d 330, 332 (Ark. 1993)); and Idaho (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co..
645 P.2d at 360)). Thus, the weight of judicial authority appears to favor imposition
of the higher standard of proof.
C

Public policy favors imposing a clear and convincing standard of proof.

Regardless of the number of jurisdictions favoring one standard over the other,

4

In addition, although Iowa requires that unsolemnized marriages be proved by
a preponderance of the evidence, such claims are subject to heightened scrutiny. See
Matter of Estate of Stodola. 519 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Iowa App. 1994) (Unsolemnized
marriages must be proved by a "preponderance of clear, consistent, and convincing
evidence"); In re Marriage of Winegard. 257 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Iowa 1977) (Claims
are to be "closely scrutinized and regarded with suspicion").
Colorado has been cited as having imposed the clear and convincing standard
of proof. See Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n. 234 P.2d 901, 903
(Colo. 1951) (Evidence of unsolemnized marriage should be "clear, consistent and
convincing"). However, in People v. Lucero. 747 P.2d 660, 664 n.6 (Colo. 1988), the
Colorado Supreme Court explained that "[tjhis language was not chosen in order to
establish a higher burden of proof for those attempting to prove a common law
marriage, but instead merely stresses that the parties must be present more than vague
claims unsupported by competent evidence."
8

there are persuasive reasons for adopting the clear and convincing standard in Utah.
Among them is the need to establish with certainty legal rights and obligations that
derive from the legal status of marriage. Such rights and obligations may be at stake
in the context of divorce, estate distribution, assertion of evidentiary privileges, and
survivors' claims for various forms of public assistance. Solemnized marriages are
thought to define such rights with a degree of certainty not characteristic of
unsolemnized, unrecorded marriages.5 As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, the fact
that persons possessing no clear legal record of marriage can assert claims to such
rights as common-law spouses creates a potential for fraud, especially where the
claimant stands to gain financially.6 Imposition of a high standard of proof minimizes
the risk of fraud be requiring claimants to establish the existence of such marriages
with a high degree of definiteness.

5

In In re Veta's Estate. 170 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah 1946), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
The purpose of enactments requiring the solemnization of marriage
before an authorized person, together with those dealing with the prior
procurement of a license, is doubtless to protect the parties to the marriage
contract in the rights flowing therefrom, and likewise to protect their offspring.
A solemn record of the contract is made to which recourse may be had when
rights or obligations of the husband or wife arising from the marriage are in
issue. So, too, are the interests of third parties in dealing with either of the
contracting parties, subsequent to the marriage, thus protected.
6

In Whvte v. Blair. 885 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1995), the court stated:
Care must given to guard against fraudulent marriage claims, especially
where a declaration of marriage would reap financial rewards for an
alleged spouse. When a reward is available, human nature may choose
to strengthen and augment, in retrospect, the consent to marry that was
only tentative before the reward became available/ (citations omitted)
9

There is support in other areas of the law for the higher standard of proof
Although most civil claims need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence,7
the clear and convincing standard has been applied in the following types of civil
proceedings, among others

civil commitment (State v Drobel. 815 P2d 724, 728 n 5

(Utah App 1991)), termination of parental rights (Woodward v Fazzio. 823 P 2d 474,
477 (Utah App 1991)), civil contempt (State v Drobel. 815 P 2d 724 (Utah App
1991), denaturalization (Chaunt v United States. 364 US 350 (I960)), and
deportation (Woodbv v INS, 385 US 276 (1966))

A common element in these civil

proceedings is the presence of contested individual interests deemed worthy of extra
protection

Given the seriousness of the rights and obligations that derive from

marriage and the importance traditionally accorded to mamage by our legal system,8 is
reasonable to require those seeking to prove common-law marriages to do so by the
same standard used to determine other interests of substantial importance

7

Maxfield v Denver & no Grande Western RR Co. 330 P 2d 1018, 1021
(Utah 1958)
8

See Norton v MacFarlane. 818 P 2d 8, 18 (Utah 1991), where Justice Howe
in concurrence and dissent, stated
While marriage is m one sense a private contract between the parties, it
is also a relationship in which the state is vitally interested and, because
of such interest, the law attaches thereto certain rights and duties,
irrespective of the wishes of the parties Mamage is in its nature a
permanent status and has been properly referred to as the most
important of all civil relations (citation omitted)
See also. Crawford v State. 629 So 2d 745, 758 (Ala. Cr App 1993) ("[D]ue
to the serious nature of the marriage relationship, the courts will closely scrutinize a
claim of common-law mamage and require clear and convincing pjpof thereof,f)
10

D.
The benefits of imposing a clear and convincing standard of proof
outweigh its disadvantages.
Arguments can be made in favor of imposing a lower standard of proof. One
such argument might be that the higher standard prejudices cohabitants who live for
long periods of time as though married but then find themselves unable to establish
entitlement to benefits reserved for lawful spouses Upon termination of common-law
marriage by death or separation, this problem could arise in the context of claims for
government benefits for surviving spouses,9 or in connection with claims for spousal
support. In addition, some jurisdictions have concluded that it is appropriate to
presume valid marriage, instead of cohabitation, as a matter of moral principle 10
Finally it could be argued that imposing the higher standard of proof may make it
more difficult for the State to prove welfare fraud under the statue.
These arguments, though not without merit, are not persuasive Although the
clear and convincing standard may make it more difficult for persons who live in
genuine common-law marriages to claim benefits reserved for legal spouses, it should
have the concomitant effect of making it more difficult to claim such benefits
fraudulently

Obviously, the public has an interest m minimizing fraud with respect to

9

Crabtree, supra, at 275, has stated that "[o]ne context for the refusal to
recognize common-law marriage, and the most inequitable consequence of that policy,
has been the denial of workers' compensation benefits to spousal equivalents of
deceased employees. With few exceptions, cohabitants have consistently been denied
any benefits afforded a legally marriage spouse."
10

See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co . 645 P.2d at 361 (stating that in Idaho "the
law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and no concubinage; legitimacy,
and not bastardy, every intendment of the law leans to matrimony.").
11
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publicly financed benefit programs. Given the ease with which solemnized marriage
may be obtained, society's interest in reducing fraud outweighs the prejudice to the
minority of persons which chooses to rely upon the traditionally disfavored doctrine of
common-law marriage.
Whether the law as a matter of principle should favor finding unsolemnized
marriages where possible instead of cohabitation alone is debatable; the legislature has
not expressed approval of this position. Again, there seems little reason to accord
favor to unsolemnized marriage when solemnized marriage is readily available. As
concerns the potennally diminished ability of the State to use the common-law
marriage statue to reduce welfare fraud, whatever disadvantage this may produce
should be offset by the State's enhanced ability to defend against fraudulent claims to
benefits for which eligibility is dependent upon lawful marriage.
E.

Conclusion.

Because of the importance of legal rights and obligations deriving from
marriage, the need to establish these rights and obligations with certainty, and the
potential for fraud inherent in claims based upon common-law marriage, it is
appropriate to require that such claims be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
THE FACTORS WHICH PLAINTIFF MUST PROVE.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 sets forth the following factors which must be
established in order for the Court to find the existence of a common law marriage:
The claimed common law marriage must arise out of a contract between two
consenting parties who:

12

1)

are capable of giving consent,

2)

are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the

provisions of this chapter,
3)

have cohabited,

4)

mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations, and

5)

hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general

reputation as husband and wife
By clear and convincing evidence the facts bear out that both parties are and
were capable of giving consent, that they are and were capable of entering a
solemnized marriage under the provisions of law, that they cohabited, and that they
mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and obligations I spend little further time
with those issues What remains, therefore is whether they held themselves out as and
have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife and whether they
consented to a common law marital contract
Whether the parties held themselves out as husband and wife is a fact sensitive
question In this case the more persuasive evidence is that for a time they did hold
themselves out as husband and wife

When she used insurance forms to claim medical

benefits for herself from Mike's insurance earner Laura was holding herself out as
Mike's wife

When they were visited in the home by the membership clerk of their

local church unit regarding Mike's status m the ward and when they took their son to a
local church leader to prepare the son for baptism in their church they each held
themselves out as husband and wife Finally, for a time Laura wore a ring on the
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finger of her left hand traditionally viewed as the marriage finger. I conclude that for
a time Mike and Laura held themselves out as husband and wife. 11
While they may have held themselves out as husband and wife, the statute also
requires that they acquire a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. This
did not happen.
Several of Mike's witnesses testified that they were friends of the parties and
frequently visited with the parties in the residence during the period of cohabitation.
These witnesses testified that they viewed the parties as a couple but never viewed the
couple as married. In other words, in the home where the parties were residing they
were not viewed by their most intimate friends as a married couple.

Yet these were

the friends of the parties, those who knew them best. If they did not view Mike and
Laura as husband and wife, one well may wonder who did view them as husband and
wife. Because among their closest associates they did not have a uniform reputation
as husband and wife it is impossible for me to conclude that Mike has carried his
burden on this issue by clear and convincing evidence. 12

11

It is appropriate in this context to look to the motivations of the parties. Laura asserts
now that there was no common law marriage. She has a financial incentive to avoid a
common law marriage-she wants to keep the home free of any claim by Mike. At the same
time Mike has a financial incentive to establish a common law marriage—he wants to establish
an interest in the home. Each of these appear offsetting. On the other hand, Laura had a
direct financial incentive at the time she represented to the insurance provider that she was
Mike's wife—she wanted her medical bills paid by an insurance carrier which owed her no
legal duty. In that setting she held herself out as Mike's wife.
12

To Mike's apparent surprise at trial, one of his witnesses admitted to an intimate
relationship with Laura during the time she was cohabiting with Michael. Obviously Laura's
participation in such a relationship indicates that she did not consider her relationship with
Mike to be of sufficient strength to avoid a different, entangling relationship. More
importandy, however, none of these witnesses viewed the parties as husband and wife.
14

Not only does Mike fail to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
parties acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife, he has failed to
establish that each party consented to a common law marriage relationship.
In this case there is no single, clear fact demonstrating that Laura consented to
a common law marital contract. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. On several
occasions Mike asked Laura to marry him. Each time she refused. That she rejected
his several proposals is evidence that she had not consented to a marital relationship.
While consent must be established, as noted by the Supreme Court in Whvte v
Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 794, n. 3 (Utah 1994), mutual consent can be shown by
acquiescence. The facts establish that for her own financial benefit Laura
affirmatively held herself out to the insurance company as Mike's wife. To avoid
embarrassment she held herself out to the church representatives as Mike's wife. For a
time she wore a ring on her marriage finger. For several months she allowed Mike to
live in the home, enjoying a conjugal relationship and sharing family expenses. All of
these demonstrate some measure of acquiescence by her in the existence of a marital
relationship. On the other hand, that acquiescence is overcome by her own continued
insistence that the parties not remarry. She knowingly chose not to accept Mike's
marriage proposals. That evidence, which is clear and convincing, offsets any alleged
acquiescence in a marital relationship. Laura knew Mike wanted to remarry and
repeatedly declined. Rather than evidencing consent, this evidences just the opposite,
an insistent lack of consent.
Finally, a word about the inequity in the prior divorce decree. During the
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period of cohabitation at issue now Laura admitted to Mike and to third parnes that
Mike had not received a fair share of the equity of the home in the divorce

That she

acknowledged that inequity but did nothing meaningful to remedy the inequity, such as
remarrying or transferring an interest to Mike, speaks against Mike's claim that Laura
acquiesced in the marriage

Had she acquiesced in a mantal relationship it is likely

she would have taken some affirmative action to remedy the inequity

Instead, she

maintained some continued distance between each of their financial situations as she
did not remedy the inequity by transfers of property and she declined to join in any
joint tax returns.
While I am troubled by the inequity that Laura acknowledges existed following
the divorce, I do not have the discretion to find a common law marriage in a case
where the facts do not warrant that conclusion.
In determining whether a relationship satisfies the requirements of Utah Code
Ann. § 30-l-4.5(l)(a) through (e), numerous factors should be considered. No
single factor is determinative. See People v Lucero. 747 P.2d 660, 665 (Colo.
1987) (en banc). Evidence of each element is essential. Consennng parties must
show cohabitation, assumption of mantal rights and duties, a general reputation
as husband and wife, capacity to marry, and capacity to give consent.
Whvte v Blair, supra, at

(emphasis added).

Taking all of this evidence together, I find that Mike has failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence either that Laura consented to a mantal relationship or
that the parties acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. Mike's
complaint for the determination of a common law marriage must be dismissed.
H.

CONTEMPT.
Both parties have alleged the other is in contempt of existing orders of the
16

court by their continual harassing actions during and surrounding visitation. In that
claim each is correct. Each of the parties have acted contemptibly in the way that
they have dealt with the other during the necessary interactions between them arising
from their being co-parents of two children. Obviously they have developed a
worthless bitterness between them that has fueled actions which are both obnoxious
and in contempt of the orders of the court. Each party merits sanction by the Court.
I have strong feelings about the extent of Laura's contempt. She has
discounted the extent of her contempt by pointing an accusatory finger at Mike for his
claimed or actual violations of the protective orders issued by the Court. She has
feigned innocence. Yet the record is clear that she has baited Mike in an effort to
cause him continuing problems with the criminal courts and frequently she has exacted
her own punitive response against Mike when she has not liked the result of Court
rulings. While she asserts excuse, those excuses are without merit. What she did is
impose her own rules on Mike's visitation in violation of the direct orders of the court.
She is in contempt of the Court.
Upon reaching the conclusion that Laura is in contempt of court, and believing
that the sting of either a fine or a jail sentence for Laura may fall most heavily on the
children, I had intended to take away essentially all of Laura's Christmas vacation
visitation in order to make clear to her that she, too, has been in open violation of the
orders of the Court. Since reaching that conclusion I have received a detailed report
by the guardian ad litem which addresses a claimed action by Mike which places in
question his continued unsupervised visitation of the children. That matter is set for
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hearing on Monday, December 23, 1996. As a result, I decline today to impose any
sanction on either Mike or Laura for their contempt of the court's orders, but will wait
until the conclusion of the December 23, 1996 hearing to impose the sanctions which
seem appropriate. Each must know, however, that a sanction is forthcoming.
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Laura's counsel
is directed to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment of dismissal
of Mike's common law marriage claim.
Dated this ^—' day of December, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

ANTHONY ,W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE
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Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, this matter is
before the Court on plaintiffs motion to amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Having considered the memoranda of counsel, I deny the motion to amend,
concluding as I previously did, that the correct burden of proof is proof by clear and
convincing evidence.
Plaintiff also raises a constitutional argument. He is correct in his analysis that
his case has the potential to present the very case identified by example in the opinion
in Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918, 921, n. 3 (Utah App. 1995), where the Court
said:
We do note, however, that [Section 30-1-4.5] might present a
constitutional question in a different context. If a trial court were to
enter a judgment denying a common-law marriage within one year of
separation, and that judgment were reversed on appeal and the matter
remanded, the parties might be denied a reasonable opportunity to
comply with the plain meaning of the statute.

1

This constitutional argument is premature as there is no assurance that on
appeal the appellate courts will reverse the trial court judgment. If they do and do not
address the constitutional argument in their reversal, then the issue of the constitutional
argument will be ripe for consideration.
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, defendant's
counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order.
A
Dated this J x day of April, 1997.
BY THE

2

CO\JRT^\^ji}^^

G.

Bunch v. Enalehorn. 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
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only those circumstances affecting the best
interests of the children or the public can be
considered. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a—47
(1992). The juvenile court concluded that
the children's best interests would be served
by denying the father's petition and granting
permanent custody to the aunt. We agree.

Barbara Lynn BUNCH, Plaintiff,
Appellant, and CrossAppellee,
v.
Brian Lynn ENGLEHORN, Defendant,
Appellee, and Cross-Appellant.
No. 930707-CA.

CONCLUSION
The juvenile court incorrectly concluded
that section 78-3a-47 required a material
change of circumstances in the currently existing custodial relationship. Any change of
circumstances affecting the interests of the
children was sufficient for purposes of the
statute.
Nevertheless, the father also had the burden to show that, in light of the changed
circumstances, the best interests of his children or the public require a change in the
custody arrangement. He has failed to meet
this Jburden. The juvenile court adequately
addressed the children's best interests. The
court determined that, in light of those interests, the father's petition for restoration of
custody should be denied and the aunt's petition for permanent custody granted.
The court did not exceed the scope of its
discretion in reaching this all-important conclusion. The father had no right to assert
the parental presumption in this case. Thus,
despite the juvenile court's incorrect interpretation of section 78-3a—47, we affirm its
decision on the proper grounds of the children's best interests. See Maertz v. Maertz.
827 P.2d 259, 262 (Utah App.1992) ("We may
affirm the trial court on any proper
ground.").
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., concur.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 22. 1995.

Appeal was taken from order of the
Fifth District Court, Iron County, J. Philip
Eves, J., dismissing divorce complaint on
grounds complainant had not met statutory
criteria for establishing marriage. The
Court of Appeals, Bench. J., held that: (1;
statutory requirement that determination or
establishment of unsolemnized marriage occr.r during relationship or within one year
following termination of that relationship was
not satisfied by tiling of divorce complaint
within one year of parties' separation, and (2)
claims challenging constitutionality of statute
establishing procedure by which partie- validate unsolemnized marriage relationship
could not be raised for first time on appeal.
Affirmed.

1. Appeal and Error <3=>370
Failure to timely pay filing fee on appeal
from district court did not deprive Court of
Appeals of jurisdiction. Rules App.Proc.
Rule 3(a).
2. Divorce 0=^177
Order dismissing divorce complaint was
final and appealable, despite purported husband's oral request for attorney fees, where
court declared in judgment that purported
husband could claim attorney fees through
filing of appropriate motion, and no motion
wras ever filed with trial court. U.C.A.1953,
78-20-56.
3. Marriage <S=»55
Statutory requirement that determination or'establishment of unsolemnized marriage occur during relationship or within one
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vear following termination of that relationship was not satisfied by filing of divorce
complaint within one year of parties' separation. U.C.A.1953, 30-1-4.5.
4. Marriage 0^55
Statute governing validation of unsolemnized marriage relationship applied to relationship that began before statute's enactment but lasted beyond enactment. U.C.A.
1953. 30-1-4.5.
5. Statutes @=»190
When statutory language is plain and
unambiguous. Court of Appeals will not look
beyond it to surmise legislature's intent.

In May 1991, Bunch filed a divorce complaint
against Englehorn.
In June 1993, a trial was held. After
opening statements, Englehorn orally moved
the trial court to dismiss Bunch's complaint.
The trial court granted Englehorn's motion,
determining "that no court or administrative
order was ever obtained establishing the parties' relationship as a marriage within the
required time limits" of section 30-1-4.5 of
the Utah Code. The trial court concluded
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore dismissed the case with
prejudice.
.ANALYSIS

tf. Appeal and Error <3=>170(2)
To assert constitutional claims on apoeal, parties generally must assert them first
in trial court.
7. Divorce 0=>179
Claims challenging constitutionality of
statute establishing procedure by which parties can validate unsolemnized marriage relationship could not be raised for first time on
appeal from dismissal of divorce complaint.
U.C.A.1953, 30-1-4.5.

Gary Bell, Salt Lake City, and Stephen W.
Julien. Cedar City, for Appellant.
Willard R. Bishop, Cedar City, for Appellee.
Before Judges ORME, BENCH and
JACKSON.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Bunch appeals the trial court's dismissal of
-er divorce complaint, claiming that the trial
-ourt erred when it ruled that she had not
•ttet the statutory criteria for establishing a
carriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5
1995). We affirm.
FACTS
Bunch and Englehorn lived together for
several years, without ever solemnizing a
carriage. In August 1990, they separated.

Bunch appealed from the trial court's order of dismissal and Englehorn counter-appealed claiming that this court does not have
jurisdiction over the appeal. Wre first address Englehorn's jurisdictional issues. We
note that it is unnecessary to file a separate
notice of appeal as a prerequisite to challenge the jurisdiction of appellate courts.
See Utah RApp.P. 10(a)(1).
[1] Englehorn contends that this court
does not have jurisdiction because Bunch did
not timely pay her filing fees. However, the
Utah Supreme Court has declared that 'the
timely payment of [filing] fees on an appeal
from the district court to this [c]ourt is no
longer jurisdictional." State v. Johnson, 700
P.2d 1125, 1129 n. 1 (Utah 1985); see also
Utah R.App.P. 3(a), (f).
[2] Englehorn also contends that the trial
court did not issue a final judgment or order
because a question involving attorney fees is
still pending. The trial court dismissed
Bunch's complaint "with prejudice and upon
the merits." In response to Englehorn's oral
request for attorney fees, the trial court declared in its Judgment of Dismissal with
Prejudice, "[t]hat should Defendant desire to
claim attorney fees pursuant to UCA 78-2756 (1953, as amended), he may do so through
the filing of an appropriate motion, with appropriate supporting affidavit and memorandum, in order to give Plaintiff ample opportunity to respond." No motion was ever filed
with the trial court. Thus, the trial court's
order to dismiss conclusively disposed of all
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claims pending before the trial court. 1 This
court, therefore, has jurisdiction over the
appeal.
[3,4] Bunch contends that the trial court
incorrectly determined that she had not met
the requirements of section .30-1-4.5 to establish a marriage by merely filing her complaint for divorce. We disagree.
Until passage of section 30-1-4.5, Utah did
not recognize unsoiemnized relationships as
marriages. Walters v. Walters, S12 P.2d 64,
67-68 (Utah App.l99U cert, denied 836 P.2d
1383 (Utah 1992). In 1987. the legislature
enacted section 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code.In section 30-1-4.5, the legislature established the only procedure by which parties
can validate an unsoiemnized marriage relationship. That section provides as follows:
( D A marriage which is not solemnized
according to this chapter snail be legal and
valid if a court or administrative
order
establishes that it arises out of a contract
between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions
of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital
duties, and obligations; and

rights,

(e) who hold themselves out as and have
acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of
a -marriage under this section must occur
during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or icithin one year following
the termination of that relationship.
Evidence of a marriage recognizable under
this section may be manifested in any
form, and may be proved under the same
1. During oral argument before this court, counsel for Englehom conceded that the trial court's
order was a final judgment if Englehorn chose
never to file for attorney fees.
2.

Englehorn cites U7zv:e v. Blair, 385 P.2d 791,
793 n. 2 (Utah 1994) for the proposition that the
parties' relationship could not be established
pursuant to section 30-1-4.5 because Englehorn
and Bunch began their relationship before 1987.

general rules of evidence as facts in other
cases.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995; emphasis
added).
[5] This court reviews the trial court's
interpretation of section 30-1—4.5 1995) under a correctness standard. Utah Sign. Inc.
v. Utah Dept of Tramp., 896 P.2d b32, 63334 (Utah 1995). "When interpreting statutes, this court is guided by the long-standing rule that a statute should be construed
according to its plain language." Id. at 633.
Thus, when the statutory language is plain
and unambiguous, we will not look beyond it
to surmise the legislature's intent. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d iWx 6*6 (Utah
1989). Moreover, "[unambiguous language
in the statute may not be interpreted to
contradict its plain meaning." Bonham v.
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per
curiam).
Section 30-1—4.5 requires that those who
wish to establish their relationship as a marriage recognized by the state must obtain ua
court or administrative order establish[ing]"
their relationship. Utah Code Ann. § 30-14.5(1) (1995). Moreover, the statute requires
that any such order be obtained within one
year of the termination of the relationship.
Id. § 30-1-4.5(2). Subsection (2) specifically
provides that "determination or establishment of a marriage . . . must occur during
the relationship . . . or within one year following the termination of that relationship."
Bunch admittedly did not obtain a determination during her relationship with Englehorn or within one year after the termination
of their relationship. The parties separated
in August 1990 and the trial court dismissed
the case in June 1993, nearly three years
after the parties separated. Bunch proposes
that she complied with the statute by filing
her complaint in May 1991, within one year
Englehorn misreads the supreme court's language in footnote 2 of Whyte. The supreme
court merely stated that relationships that began
and ended prior to 1987 were not valid, since
common-law marriages were not recognized in
Utah'prior to the enactment of section iO-l—*-3Because the parties' relationship indisputably
lasted beyond 1987, the statute could apply in the
present case. Id.
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rf the parties separation. That interpretaitofl 0f the statute, however, is contrary to its
-jaia meaning. Under the piain meaning of
. statute, Bunch did not obtain a timely
^ennination of her relationship with EngleBunch suggests that this interpretation of
rig statute renders it unconstitutional under
~ArOcle I, Sections 7 and 11 of the Constitution of Utah. Bunch never presented these
jyguments to tne trial court, but raises them
for the first time on appeal.
{6,7] To assert constitutional claims on
appeal, parties must generally assert them
fast in the trial court. In State v. Bobo, 803
pid 1268 (Utah App.1990). this court de»2ired that "the proper forum in which to
commence thoughtful and probing analysis of
gate constitutional interpretation is before
She trial court, not. as typically happens . . .
- fcr the first time on appeal" Id. at 1273.
lie closest Bunch came to making a constiMstional argument to the trial court occurred
wben the trial court asked counsel whether
the facts of the case reflected any order that
hd timely established a marital relationship.
Counsel responded that there was no order,
but MI guess I would have some concerns
about the constitutionality of such a statute
*feen it would make it—when a person files a
Complaint to nave that determination made,
tod simply because of the delays and court
&ne and that sort of thing, I: can't get it to
own." There is no thougntful or probing
- ^ysifc of a state constitutional question in
Bunch's statement. Bunch merely alludes to
toe fact that mere may possibly be a consti^onal que-tion. "Nominally alluding" to
ssfctitutional questions "without any analysis
or
the r e d a n s stated, we cc not review the
^nMituuon^n of section 30-1-4 5
We do
c
nowe\er that the statute might present a
Con
stHutiona' question in a dirterent context If
to
urt were to enter a muement aenvine a

before the trial court does not sufficiently
raise the issue to permit consideration by
this court on appeal." State v. Johnson, 111
P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App.1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991).
Bunch also claims that she was surprised
by Englehorn's oral motion to dismiss, despite the fact that Englehorn had asserted
this position as an affirmative defense in his
verified answer. Assuming, arguendo, that
Bunch was surprised by the motion, she
could have asked the trial court for a continuance and/or made a post-judgment motion to
present her issues to the trial court. She did
nothing to preserve the issues in the trial
court. Having failed to argue her constitutional issues to the trial court, we refuse to
consider them. See id; accord Bobo, 803
P.2d at 1273.3
CONCLUSION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal.
Bunch did not meet the requirements of section 30-1^4.5 to establish a marriage with
Englehorn and her constitutional challenge
was improperly raised for the first time on
appeal. Therefore, the trial court did not err
in dismissing the case.
Affirmed.
ORME, P.J., and JACKSON, J., concur.

E KEY N U * 5 E F SYSTEM >

common-lau marriage within one vear of separation, and that judgment were re\ersed on appeal
and the matter remanded, the parties might be
denied a reasonable opportunity to comply with
the plain meaning of the statute
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Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co., 448 P.2d 148 (Mont.
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Mona Carter M I L L E R , Claimant
and Respondent,
Charles D. Carter, Deceased,
v.
TOWNSEND
LUMBER
COMPANY, Inc.,
Employer, and Pacific Compensation Company, Insurance Carrier, Defendants and
Appellants.

No. I 1230.
Supremo Court of Montana.
Submitted Nov. 22. 1968.
Decided Dec. 5, 1068.

P r o c e e d i n g on claim for workmen's
compensation benefits. T h e First District
Court, L e w i s a n d Clark County, James D.
F r e e b o u r n e , J., r e n d e r e d judgment reversing the action oi the Industrial Accident B o a r d and d e t e r m i n i n g that claimant
was c o m m o n - l a w wife of deceased workman and was t h e r e f o r e entitled to benefits.
T h e S u p r e m e Court, J a m e s T. Harrison,
C. J., held t h a t instances of cohabitation on
part of parties could support conclusion of
meretricious r e l a t i o n s as easily as any other
and w e r e insufficient to show course of
conduct to establish reputation as husband
and wife.
J u d g m e n t r e v e r s e d and order of Board
reinstated.

1. Marriage <3=320(2)
T o constitute a " m a r r i a g e per verba de
praesenti", the p a r t i e s must agree to become
husband and w i f e presently, and the consent
which is the essence of such marriage contract must be mutual and given at same
time, and it m u s t contemplate a present
assumption oi m a r r i a g e status.
R.C.M.
1947, §§ 4 8 - 1 0 1 , 48-103.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

mere cohabitation alone.
48-101, 48-103.
3. Marriage

R.C.M.1947, §§

022

T h e date of a marriage, established by
conduct, cohabitation and repute, is the date
of the commencement of such conduct and
repute and not afterwards. R.C.M. 1947, §§
48-101, 48-103.
4. Marriage C=>13

M u t u a l consent of parties able to consent and competent to enter into ceremonial
m a r r i a g e a n d assumption of marital relationship by consent and agreement as of a
time certain, followed by cohabitation and
repute, a r e necessary to effect a "commonlaw m a r r i a g e " .
R.CM.1947, §§ 48-101.
48-103.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Marriage

022

T o effect common-law marriage, parties must enter upon course oi conduct to
establish t h e i r repute as man and wife, and
such c o u r s e of conduct must be complete
and sincere and not partial. R.C.M.1947, §§
48-101, 48-103.
6. Marriage

022

By " r e p u t e " essential to effect common-law m a r r i a g e is meant reputation or
the c h a r a c t e r and status commonly ascribed
to one's actions by public. R.CM.1947, §§
48-101, 48-103.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
7. Workmen's Compensation C=H474
It w a s incumbent upon woman who
sought to collect workmen's compensation
benefits on ground that she was commonlaw wife of workman at time of his death
to p r o v e by preponderance of evidence that
mutual and public assumption of marital
relation existed. R.CM.1947, §§ 48-101,
48-103.
.

2. Marriage € = 2 2

8. Marriage <S=22

A lawful m a r r i a g e must have been entered into by t h e parties at some particular
time a n d such m a r r i a g e does not result from

I n s t a n c e s of cohabitation on part of
parties could support conclusion of meretricious relations as easily as any other and
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were insufficient to show course of conduct
to establish reputation as husband and wife.
R.CM.1947. §§ 48-101, 4S-103.
9. Workmen's Compensation C=>I939
District Court is not justified in reversing: findings of Industrial Accident
Board if there is sufficient evidence to sustain them.
10. Workmen's Compensation <$=3l474
Evidence sustained finding" of Industrial Accident Board that woman who
sought to collect workmen's compensation
benefits payable to survivor of deceased
workman was not common-law wife of deceased workman. R.CM.1947, §§ 48-101,
48-103.

Patrick F. Hooks (argued), Townsend,
Ross Cannon (argued), Helena, for defendants and appellants.
Lloyd J. Skedd (argued), Helena, for
claimant and respondent.
JAMES T. HARRISOX, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from the district court
of Broadwater County in a case arising
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
It raises the sole question of whether a
valid marriage existed between Mona
Miller and the deceased Charles D. Carter
at the t:rne of his death in an industrial accident or. February 26, 1964.
The Industrial Accident Board held that
mere was no marriage and Mona's claim
^a> clerv.ed. Deceased's mother survived
h;m a:y; r.tr claim for the benefits provided
by the \\ orkmen's Compensation Act was
approve:;. An appeal was taken by Mona to
me district court and that court entered
t'.nmryjs or fact, conclusions of law and
r.iMirmer.t reversing the action of the Industrial .\cc:dent Board and determining that
•»*ona was the common-law wife of the decc'icm. This appeal followed.
We wdl set forth a brief recitation of
*he fac situation prevailing. Charles D.
Carter hereafter referred to as Charles,
*n<i Mona Miller, being Mona Miller McXVi
»iams and referred to in this case as

Mona Miller Carter, hereafter referred to
as Mona, met in January of 1963 in California at which time both were married to
other persons. Within two or three weeks
following this meeting they commenced living together. Charles' wife, Mary Carter,
wras killed in an automobile accident on
June 24, 1963. About the 5th day of July,
1963 Charles and Mona arrived in Townsend, Montana, and stayed at a truck stop
known as the Beacon, owned and operated
by Charles' sister. While they stayed there
Mona worked for Charles' sister and her
pay checks were made out to her as Mona
Miller.
Along about September 4th or 5th, 1963,
they went to Billings where for a time they
resided at the Blue Motel. Mona's husband
divorced her on October 18, 1963, but she
did not know oi a possible divorce until she
received a letter from her mother around
November 4, 1963, in which her mother
wrote that she had heard a divorce had been
granted. Mona did not receive a copy of
the decree, nor did she know the date or
place of granting the divorce, until after
Charles' death. About January 17, 1964,
Charles came back to Townsend, Mona remained in Billings and moved to the Harris
Apartments, where she registered as Mona
Miller and her apartment utilities were under the name of Mona Miller. On January
27, 1964, Charles assigned a car title to
Mona showing her name as Mona G. Miller.
Mona went to work in the Turf Cafe in
Billings and her pay checks were made out
to Mona Miller. She registered for general
delivery at the Billings post office as Mona
Miller, received mail from Charles under
that name, as well as from other persons.
On February 14, 1964, Charles went to
Billings and Mona came back to Townsend
with him and on the 15th of February took
up residence at the Beacon Motel. Eleven
davs later Charles was killed.
Charles wrote his mother a letter from
Billings, dated January 18, 1964, and we
quote portions thereof:
"Well, I don't know for sure when I will
be leaving here. But I was planning on
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going around the 5th of Feb. But Mona
and I are having troubles now too. So I
may just up and go next week. But I doubt
it for I wont have enough money to get me
there. So I suppose I will have to wait
until around the 5th of Feb.
"Her and I were figiiering on getting
married this spring. But I don't think we
will, for we just can't seem to get along for
very long at a time. She is pretty hot
headed, and so am I and one thing just leads
to another, until we are at it.
"I met her last March, when Mary and I
were having our trouble. And we got along
real swell, until Mar/ got killed and we
came up here, and its been a fight seems
like ever since."
The letter then referred to the death of
his wife, Mary, and continued: ''And from
then on it seems like Mona and I have done
nothing but argue. So as I say I may be
leaving here by myself before or around the
5th of Feb."
There is considerable testimony in the
record as to quarrels and arguments between Charles and Mona.
At the hearings in this cause, besides herself, Mona presented two witnesses in her
behalf. Iona Pauley, operator of the Blue
Motel, testified on direct examination as to
Charles and Mona living together in the
motel and she thought they were husband
and wife, that Mona had told her they were
married in April of 1963. On cross-examination she testified that sometime after
Christmas Charles said to her : "I guess you
know Mona and I aren't married." She
further testified that following the death of
Charles she received a letter from Mona in
which she said that Charles had been killed
and that she was his common-law wife.
Art Olson, a resident of Helena for the
past seven years and before that a resident
of Townsend, testified as to his acquaintance with Charles over many years but he
had not seen him for six or seven years
when he met him on Main Street in Townsend on February 8, 1964, at which time
they had a conversation and Olson asked
about his wife Mary and Charles replied:

"Mary is dead, I have a new wife, Mona."
They did not see each other again.
On cross-examination it developed that
after Charles' death Olson had gone to see
Charles' sister and brother-in-law to find
out what was going on, what was the deal.
He said he had met Mona and he was trying
to find out what this insurance was, who
was supposed to get the money. He further
admitted that he was a married man but not
living with his wife and while he denied
going with Mona he admitted they had been
out together for dinner six or eight times
in the preceding two months.
Offsetting this testimony was that of
fellow workers and residents of Townsend
whose testimony reflected that Charles
never held Mona out as his wife, nor did
Mona hold Charles out as her husband previous to his death. Of course there are exhibits of various kinds indicating that on
occasion Mona used the name Carter instead of Miller but most of these are after
the death of Charles.
On this record the district court reversed
the holding of the Industrial Accident
Board and held that Mona was the commonlaw wife of Charles within the meaning of
section 48-101, R.C.M.1947.
The district judge filed an opinion in
this cause outlining his reasons for arriving
at his judgment and we quote:
"Claimant and deceased commenced to
live together in January, February or July,
1963. From that time until January 18.
1964, the evidence introduced showed conditions existed very similar to those set
forth in Morrison, et al., v. Sunshine
Mining Company, 64 Idaho 6, 127 P.2d 766f
and Albina Engine and Machine Works,
etc., v. J. J. O'Leary, et al., 9 Cir., 32S F.2d
877. Both cases held a common law marriage existed.
"We can accept the relationship between
claimant and Charles Carter as illicit in
1963. It is agreed by all that claimant and
Charles Carter did live together and carried
on certain relations as if they were husband
and wife.
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"Sometime immediately prior to January
18, 1964, claimant, over a dispute, left deceased and went to live alone in Billings.
Decedent on January 18, 1964, wrote his
mother that he intended to marry Nona
(sic) if all could be straightened out. Six
weeks before his death Charles Carter went
to Billings and returned to Townsend wTith
Nona (sic). They did not return to live in
the sister's bar, but rented an apartment and
claimant and Charles Carter lived in the relationship he described in his letter to his
mother, that of husband and wife, Section
48-101, R.C.M.1947, being fully satisfied.'1
[1-6] The two cases cited by the court
are both interpretations of the Idaho statutes. There is no reason to discuss either
case herein for the reason that our laws are
not the same and this court in Miller v.
Sutherland, 131 Mont. 175, 309 P.2d 322, reviewed the Montana statutes and cases and
this cause is to be determined under the
rulings laid down therein. In that case we
stated:
"Our statute with regard to marriage is
R.C.M.1947, § 48-101, which provides:
" 'Marriage is a personal relation arising
o.it of a civil contract, to which the consent
of parties capable of making it is necessary.
Consent alone will not constitute marriage;
it must be followed by a solemnization, or
by mutual and public assumption of the
marital relation.'
"R.C.M.1947, § 48-103, provides: 'Consent to and subsequent consummation of
marriage may be manifested m any form,
and may be proved under the same general
rules of evidence as facts in other cases.'
"In construing our statutes this court in
Welch v. All Persons, 85 Mont. 114, 133, 278
P. 110, 115, stated:
u

'Marriage is defined by our statute as
a "personal relation arising out of a civil
contract, to which the consent of parties
capable of making it is necessary". Section
5695, R.C1921 [§ 4S-101, supra]. This
terse definition embraces the essential elements recognized by the authorities generally. See 38 C.J. 1272 et seq.; 18 R.C.L.
381 et seq.

'• "The consent of the parties must be mutual. Shepherd & Piercon Co. v. Baker, 81
Mont. 185, 262 P. 887. While the consent
need not be expressed in any particular
form (section 5697, R.C.1921 [§ 48-103,
supra]), as we said in State v. Newman,
66 Mont. 180, 213 P. 805, it must always be
given with such an intent on the part of
each of the parties that marriage cannot be
said to steal upon them unawares. "One
cannot become married unwittingly or accidentally. The consent required by our statutes, as well as the statutes of every state,
and by the common law, must be seriously
given with the deliberate intention that
marriage result presently
therefrom."
"There must be an agreement between the
parties that they will hold toward each
other the relation of husband and wife,
with all the responsibilities and duties which
the law attaches to such relation, otherwise
there can be no lawful marriage." Williams v. Williams, supra [46 Wis. 464, 1
N.W. 98, 32 Am.Rep. 722]. The absence of
such consent renders the relations of the
parties meretricious. 38 C.J. 1316.' * * *
"We stated in State v. Newman, 66 Mont.
180, 188, 213 P. 805,807:
" 'The necessary consent need not be expressed in any particular form. Section
5697 Rev.Codes 1921. In a proper case it
may even be implied from the conduct of
the parties. University of Michigan v. McGuckin, 64 Neb. 300, 89 N.W. 778, 57 L.R.A.
917. But the consent, whether in express
words, or implied from conduct, must always be given with such an intent on the
part of each of the parties that marriage
cannot be said to steal upon them unawares.
* * * The words manifesting the consent
may be spoken in the face of the church,
or immediately preceding an act of sexual
intercourse, as claimed in this case. But
they must always be spoken by those who
know and intend that matrimony in full
form shall be the result. Marriage cannot
be created piecemeal. It comes instantly
into being, or it does not come a t all. If
anything remains to be done before the relationship is completed in contemplation of
the parties themselves, there is no marriage.
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" ' 4Tn order to constitute a marriage per
verba [dc] praesenti the parties must agree
to become husband and wife presently. The
consent which is the foundation and essence
of the contract must be mutual and given
at the same time, and it must not be attended
by an agreement that some intervening
thing shall be done before the marriage
takes effect, or that it be publicly solemnized. That is to say, it must contemplate a
present assumption of the marriage status,
in distinction from a mere future union."
Lord Brougham in Queen v. Millis, 10 CI. &
F. 534, 708, 730; Clark v. Field, 13 Vt. 460.
Beneficial Ass'n v. Carpenter, 17 R.I. 720,
24 A. 578.'
*
*
*
*
*
*
''As was stated in Welch v. All Persons,
78 Mont. 370, 386, 254 P. 179, 183:
" 'Every lawful marriage must have been
entered into by the parties at some particular time. It does not result from mere
cohabitation alone. "As a general rule,
when a marriage is sought to be proved by
conduct, cohabitation and repute, the date
of the marriage in fact, which such conduct
and repute tends to establish, is the date of
the commencement of such conduct and repute, and not afterwards". Williams v.
Williams, 46 Wis. 464, 1 N.W. 98, 32 Am.
Rep. 722.'
*

*

*

*

*

*

"As was stated in Elliott v. Industrial
Accident Board, 101 Mont. 246, 254, 53 P.2d
451, 454:
" 'One of the disputable presumptions in
this state is "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage". Subdivision 30, sec. 10606, Rev.
Codes 1921 [R.C.M.1947, § 93-1301-7].
" 'The so-called "common-law marriage"
is recognized as valid in this state, but, to be
effective there must be the mutual consent of parties able to consent and competent to enter into a ceremonial marriage,
and the assumption of such relationship, by
consent and agreement, as of a time certain,
followed by cohabitation and repute/

"Thus the parties must enter upon a
course of conduct to establish their repute
as man and wife. This course of conduct
cannot be partial, it must be complete and
sincere. * * *
"When we speak of repute we mean reputation, being the character and status commonly ascribed to one's actions by the public. * * * The burden of establishing the
marriage was on appellant * * *."
Returning to the court's opinion the judge
accepted the relationship as illicit in 1963
and went on to state that six weeks before
his death Charles brought Mona to Townsend, although the record shows it was only
12 days; further, that they did not return
to live in the sister's bar, although the record shows that the sister's business was a
cafe and motel; further, that they rented
an apartment, although the record shows
that they stayed there but a single night and
then went to the sister's motel. There the
record shows they occupied a room with
a hot plate for cooking but it was little used
since their meals were either taken at the
cafe or carried from the cafe to their room.
The court finally observed that Charles and
Mona lived in the relationship he, Charles,
described in his letter to his mother, that of
husband and wife. We have heretofore
quoted the only portions of this letter which
directly deal with Mona and that states exactly the opposite.
[7, 8] It was incumbent upon Mona to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that a mutual and public assumption of the
marital relation existed. Instances of cohabitation on the part of the parties, and
admittedly the record is replete with such
instances here, can support the conclusion
of meretricious relations as easily as any
other. The parties must enter upon a
course of conduct to establish their repute
as man and wife. By repute we mean reputation, being the character and status commonly ascribed to one's actions by the public. The evidence herein falls far short of
establishing a reputation by Charles and
Mona that they were husband and wife.
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[9] We have many times held that the
district court is not justified in reversing
findings of the Industrial Accident Board
if there is sufficient evidence to sustain
them. See Stordahl v. Rush Implement
Co., 148 Mont. 13, 417 P.2d 95, and cases
therein cited.
[10] Our determination is that the facts
disclosed by the record here do not preponderate against the findings of the Industrial Accident Board and the district court
erred when it held that the order of the Industrial Accident Board was not sustained
by the evidence, was unreasonable and ordered the same to be set aside.
Accordingly the judgment is reversed
and the order of the Industrial Accident
Board herein is ordered reinstated.
HASWELL, ADAIR and
JT., concur.
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record disclosed that other charges, some of
them even more serious, had been dismissed.
Writ denied.

Habeas Corpus <^25.I(3)
Claims that defendant's plea of guilty to
burglary charge was obtained by fraud, deceit and trickery and that his retained counsel advised him that if he went to trial he
would receive 50-year sentence but if he pled
guilty would receive suspended sentence or
at most one year afforded no ground for
habeas corpus relief where counsel had been
active in criminal defenses for many years
and every member of the firm knew that
maximum penalty for burglary was 15 years,
counsel's statement indicated knowledgeable,
active defense work to defendant's advantage, and record disclosed that other charges, some of them even more serious, had
been dismissed. R.C.M.1947, § 94-903.

Thomas F. Holliday pro se.
MEMO O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM:

Petition of Thomas F. HOLLIDAY.
No. 11598.

Supreme Court of Montana.
Dec. 12, 1968.

Proceeding on petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court held that
claims that defendant's plea of guilty to burglary charge was obtained by fraud, deceit
and trickery and that his retained counsel
advised him that if he went to trial he would
receive 50-year sentence but if he pled guilty
would receive suspended sentence or at most
one year afforded no ground for habeas corpus relief where counsel had been active in
criminal defenses for many years and every
member of the firm knew that maximum
penalty for burglary was 15 years, counsel's
statement indicated knowledgeable, active
defense work to defendant's advantage, and
448 P.2d—10V2

Thomas F. Holliday, an inmate of the
state prison at Deer Lodge, Montana, appearing pro se, files with this Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner
was sentenced to a term oi ten years in the
district court of Yellowstone County, Montana, on February 1, 1968, following his
plea of guilty to the crime of burglary.
The court file discloses that on December 6, 1967, an information was filed charging petitioner with the crime of burglary
alleged to have been committed on December 3, 1967. Petitioner appeared before the
court on December 6, was given a copy of
the information and he informed the court
he desired counsel and that he would obtain
his own counsel. The arraignment was then
continued until December 11, 1967.
On December 11, 1967, he appeared in
court in company with one of his counsel,
Russell Fillner, of the firm of Sandall,
Moses and Cavan. A copy of the informa-

I.
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and that of defendant Hospital, the complaint alleges defendant Fishburn to be a
member of the staff of defendant Hospital
and that he was "acting as Defendant Hospital's agent and employee and performing
within the scope and course of that agency
and employment, and within the scope of
his position as a member of the Defendant
Hospital Staff." In their answers, defendants Fishburn and Hospital denied the allegations. The only reference to this allegation in the interrogatories and the answers
thereto, is an affirmative answer by defendants Fishburn and Hospital to plaintiff's question as to whether or not defendant Fishburn was a member of the staff of
defendant Hospital on June 6 and 7, 1976.
Since there is an issue as to the fact of
employment which may involve the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior,
defendant Hospital's position with reference to the summary judgment cannot be
different than that of defendant Fishburn.
Reversed.
ROONEY, Justice, separate opinion, with
whom RAPER, C. J., joins.
Although the foregoing is determinative
of this case, I believe it proper to address
the application of the so-called "locality
rule" inasmuch as I believe the record indicates the probability that the question will
arise again in connection with the trial of
this matter.1 Justices McClintock, Thomas,
and Rose do not agree with my belief and
feel that discussion of the "locality rule" is
unnecessary to the disposition of the case.
They do not join herein for that reason.

afforded by large cities. Although the rule
may have been premised upon an acceptable basis at one time, it is now without
logical basis in view of availability of modern communication methods whereby mechanical readings of body functions and reactions can be transmitted immediately to
other centers for reading and diagnosis,
available telephonic consultations, widespread dissemination of medical literature,
and means of rapid transportation. This is
not to say that testimony as to the standards in a similar community and the availability and use of modern communication
and transportation methods are not to be
considered in determination of the existence
or nonexistence of negligence, but they
should be merely one of the factors to be
considered in making this determination,
and not a single controlling factor. Negligence cannot be excused on the ground that
others in the same locality practicod the
same kind of negligence. Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W.Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967);
Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash.2d 73, 431
P.2d 973 (1967). This is said in full recognition of the statements made by this court in
Covin v. Hunter, Wyo., 374 P.2d 421 (1962).

JIM'S WATER SERVICE, Appellant
(Employer-Defendant below),
v.
Judith Marie EAYRS, on behalf of
James Clinton Eayrs, Appellee
(Employee-Plaintiff below).

The so-called "locality rule" was an alternate premise upon which the summary
judgment was granted. The rule is to the
effect that an opinion concerning the propriety of medical action taken by a physician must be prefaced by a showing of
knowledge of the standards of practice in
the community in which the physician practices, since a rural community, for example,
did not have the equipment, opportunities
for consultation and learning, and facilities

Employer appealed from judgment of
the District Court, Weston County, Paul T.

1. In such instance, " * * * it is our right, if
it is not our duty, to decide the question."

Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, 70
Wyo. 119, 127. 247 P.2d 660, 663 (1952).

No. 5037.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
March 6, 1979.
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Liamos, Jr., J., awarding death benefits,
under Workers' Compensation Law, to widow and her three children. The Supreme
Court, McClintock, J., held that: (1) the
required nexus between exertion and stress,
exerted by truck driver, and the resulting
coronary occlusion which occurred when
driver and another were attempting to extricate truck from snow, was established by
substantial evidence; (2) exertion of truck
driver in an extended effort to extricate his
truck from snow exceeded normal routine
and thus, while not different in kind, was
greater in degree than normal sufficiently
to establish that exertion occurred during a
period of stress unusual or abnormal to
working conditions as basis for recovery of
death benefits following trucker's heart attack; (3) evidence established valid common-law marriage under Montana law between truck driver and his widow and thus
widow was "legally married" for purposes
of receipt of death benefits under Wyoming's Workers' Compensation Laws; (4)
Legislature intended to make substantial
dependency the test of eligibility of allegedly dependent children for death benefits
under Workers' Compensation Law, thus
eliminating prior confusion and dispute regarding stepchildren, adoption, legitimacy,
lineage and alienage, and (5) testimony of
surviving widow sufficiently supported
finding that truck driver had provided substantially all of financial support for children so as to entitle children to death benefits, notwithstanding that widow did not
state in dollar figures how much truck driver had earned or contributed.
Judgment and order of award
firmed.

af-

1. Workers' Compensation <3=>1536
The required nexus between exertion
and stress, exerted by truck driver, and the
resulting coronary occlusion wThich occurred
when driver and another were attempting
to extricate truck from snow, was established by substantial evidence in worker's
compensation case for recovery of death
benefits. W.S.1977, § 27-12-603.

2. Workers' Compensation ^ ^ ^ l
Exertion of truck driver in an extended
effort to extricate his truck from snow exceeded normal routine and thus, while not
different in kind, was greater in degree
than normal sufficiently to establish that
exertion occurred during a period of stress
unusual or abnormal to working conditions
as basis for recovery of death benefits following trucker's heart attack, in worker's
compensation case. W.S.1977, § 27-12-603.
3. Workers' Compensation <s=>433, 1474
Evidence established valid common-law
marriage under Montana law between
truck driver and his widow who sought
worker's compensation death benefits, and
thus widow was "legally married,, for purposes of receipt of death benefits under
Wyoming's Workers' Compensation Laws.
R.C.M.1947, § 48-314; W.S.1977, §§ 20-1111, 27-12-102, 27-12-408(a).
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>458
Legislature intended to make substantial dependency the test of eligibility of
allegedly dependent children for death benefits under Workers' Compensation Law,
thus eliminating prior confusion and dispute
regarding stepchildren, adoption, legitimacy, lineage and alienage. W.S.1977, §§ 2712-102, 27-12-408(a).
5. Workers' Compensation <&=>1478
Testimony of surviving widow sufficiently supported finding that truck driver,
who died of heart attack during employment, had provided substantially all of financial support for children so as to entitle
children to death benefits under Workers'
Compensation Law, notwithstanding that
widow did not state in dollar figures how
much truck driver had earned or contributed.

Francis E. Stevens, Gillette, for appellant.
Gordon W. Schukei, Newcastle, for appellee.
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Before RAPER, C. J., McCLINTOCK,
THOMAS and ROSE, JJ., and GUTHRIE,
J., Retired.*
McCLINTOCK, Justice.
Jim's Water Service, employer, appeals
from judgment of the district court of Weston County awarding death benefits to Judith Marie Eayrs and her three children.
The claim had its basis in the death of
James Clinton Eayrs. Employer contends
that the death was not compensable under
our Worker's Compensation statutes because of failure to prove a proper causal
relation between the death and abnormal
working conditions; that Judith is not entitled to benefits as a surviving spouse because no formal marriage existed between
her and the decedent and no common-law
marriage was proved; and that award of
benefits to the children should have been
denied since their dependency upon decedent was not shown. We shall affirm, reciting the facts as they become pertinent to
the particular issue involved.
The Cause of Death
The cause of the death was determined to
be an occlusive coronary atherosclerosis.
The employer contends that the evidence
was insufficient to prove the required direct
causal connection between the condition of
the work and the death.1
On November 10, 1977 James was employed by Jim's Water Service, Inc. in Gillette. He started work the next day as a
driver of a water truck which was employed
hauling water to oil rigs in the area. His
duties basically included the driving and
some simple maintenance of the truck.
* At the time of oral argument Guthrie, J., was
Chief Justice. He retired from the court on
December 31, 1978. By order of the court,
entered on January 1, 1979, he has been retained in active judicial service pursuant to § 5,
Art. V, Wyoming Constitution and § 5 - 1 106(0, W.S.1977, and has continued to participate in the decision and opinion of the court in
this case.
1. Section 27-12-603, W.S.1977 provides in pertinent part:
"(b) Benefits for employment-related coronary conditions except those directly and

James worked long hours, sometimes driving up to 18 hours a day. Nine days after
he started to work he was hauling water to
a drilling rig in Weston County and his
truck became stuck in a snowdrift. It was
a cold day, with strong winds and deep,
blowing snow. James walked about one
mile through the snow to seek help, arriving at the residence of Jack Dowdy between
nine and ten o'clock that morning. William
Riehemann drove with him back to the
scene in Riehemann's Jeep at about three
o'clock in the afternoon but they had to
walk two to three hundred yards through
the snow to the truck. They then shoveled
vigorously for about one-half hour. About
four o'clock James climbed into the cab to
drive while Riehemann was to push. The
motor began to race, and when Riehemann
went to the cab he found James slumped
over the wheel. James stopped breathing
very shortly afterward and was pronounced
dead at 5:50 p. m.
The manager of the employer's Douglas
division testified that long hours for such
drivers were ordinary and normal. It was
not unusual or abnormal for drivers to become stuck in the snow or mud or to lift
fairly heavy objects. Each truck carried a
shovel and chains and drivers were expected to attempt to free their trucks from
difficulties. If they were unable to do so
they were expected to use a high-frequency
radio in the truck to call for help. James
made no such call.
[1] James D. Henry, M.D., a qualified
pathologist, performed an autopsy upon the
body and found the cause of death to be an
occlusive coronary atherosclerosis.
He
solely caused by an injury or disease are not
payable unless the employee establishes by
competent medical authority that there is a
direct causal connection between the condition under which the work was performed
and the cardiac condition, and then only if
the causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that
particular employment, and further that the
acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are
clearly manifested not later than four (4)
hours after the alleged causative exertion.'*
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found the heart to show existing marked
occlusion of up to 90 per cent of all three
major vessels. He declined to say that he
could determine to a reasonable medical
certainty that the stress caused or precipitated the death and stated that James could
have died in his sleep just as easily as on
the job. However, he also testified that the
stress was a "contributing factor" and that
the arrhythmia "very likely" and "probably" was due to the physical exertion and
strain. That is sufficient evidence of the
causal connection. The question that needs
to be answered is whether the work effort
contributed to a material degree to the precipitation, aggravation or acceleration of
the existing disease and the resulting death.
Claim of Vondra, Wyo., 448 P.2d 313 (1968);
Claim of Hill, Wyo., 451 P.2d 794 (1969);
Claim of Brannan. Wyo., 455 P.2d 241
(1969). See also, 1 Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law, § 12.20, p. 3-276.
While it is not a compensation case, this
quotation from Rocky Mountain Trucking
Company v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 479, 335
P.2d 448, 453 (1959) is also pertinent:
"A belief entertained by an expert is a
positive opinion about which he is entitled
to testify. His belief is not a statement
of mere possibility unless the witness so
qualifies it."
The required nexus between the exertion
and stress and the resulting coronary occlusion was found by the trier of fact and is
supported by substantial evidence.
The second aspect of this question,
whether the exertion of James occurred
during a period of stress unusual or abnormal to his working conditions, must also be
answered in claimant's favor. The manager's testimony concerning decedent's
duties and the driver's obligations when
2. This section as amended by Ch. 149, § 1, S.L.
of Wyoming 1975 permits benefits to a "spouse
to whom the employee was legally married."
Under the law prior to the 1975 amendment,
§ 27-49[II](d), W.S.1957, no benefits were permitted to a surviving spouse "unless he or she
shall have been married to the workman by a
marriage duly solemnized by legal ceremony at
the time of the injury." Section 27-87, W.S.
1957 permitted benefits to a widow or invalid
widower to whom the decedent "has been regu-

stuck does not completely answer the question. The best approach is first to ascertain
the normal and usual task of the driver and
then determine if the event in question
exceeded that limit.
[2] James was expected to haul water
and to maintain his truck. In the event he
became snowbound he was expected to use
reasonable efforts to extricate himself.
The trier of fact had sufficient substantial
evidence to find the normal routine was
exceeded when James acted to the degree
he did and that the stress or exertion, while
not different in kind, was greater in degree
than normal. It appears from the evidence
James was involved in an effort that consumed the entire day of November 20 and
involved extensive and strenuous efforts.
In Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 566 P.2d
219 (1977) we found the burden satisfied
when the causative exertion was clearly
something beyond the worker's normal and
usual routine. We will not disturb the determination of facts here.
The Marital Relation of the Parties
In order for Judith to receive benefits
under our law she must have been "legally
married" to James. Section 27-12-408(a),
W.S.1977.2
James and Judith were married in 1969
but divorced in 1974. For a while they
maintained contact after their separation
on a sporadic basis. James provided no
support during these years because of inability to do so. In June of 1977 he returned
to Kalispell and resumed living with Judith
but they did not formally remarry. Judith
was disabled and her only income was from
disability benefits provided to her by the
State. James worked periodically and prolarly married by a marriage duly solemnized by
a legal ceremony." The constitutionality of the
former statute was specifically left open in
Bowers v. Getter Trucking Company, Wyo.,
514 P.2d 837 (1973) and the cause remanded to
the district court for a determination whether a
valid common-law marriage had been effected
in Texas. That determination has now been
made and the case is again pending in this
court.
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vided such support as he could for her and
the three children, although evidence is
lacking as to the amount. They had no
joint financial accounts or other joint property. His odd-job employment required
him to leave Kalispell, and occasionally
Montana, but he always maintained Judith
and the children's residence as his own.
The two shared expenses, care, work, and a
home. They considered themselves man
and wife and represented this to friends
and the world. They were, in Judith's
words, "still married; as far as God's law
we had not been divorced."
The employer concedes that the residence
of the parties and the marriage, if any,
were in Montana and that the State of
Montana still recognizes common-law marriage. Section 48-314, R.C.M.1975. He
also concedes that under § 20-1-111, W.S.
1977 we must look to Montana as all marriages which are valid by the laws of that
state are to be valid in Wyoming. Hoagland v. Hoagland, 2TI Wyo/l78, 193 P. 843
(1920). If James and Judith were found to
be validly married under the common law,
she would therefore be entitled to benefits
under our statute. The point of the employer's argument is that the facts here do
not support the trial court's decision finding
a valid common-law marriage and giving
Judith her due.
As essential elements of such a marriage
Montana requires mutual consent, assumption of a relationship by consent and agreement as of a certain time, cohabitation, and
repute. Welch v. All Persons, 78 Mont. 370,
254 P. 179 (1927); Elliott v. Industrial Accident Board, 101 Mont. 246, 53 P.2d 451
(1936); Miller v. Sutherland, 131 Mont. 175,
309 P.2d 322 (1957). The burden to prove
these elements is on the one asserting the
validity of the marriage, and is satisfied by
a preponderance of the evidence. However,
there is a strong presumption in favor of
the legality of a common-law marriage.
Welch v. All Persons, supra; In re Estate of
Slavens, 162 Mont. 123, 509 P.2d 293 (1973).
The element of repute is a key term, and
several cases where the Supreme Court reversed the finding turned on this issue.
Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co., 152 Mont.

210, 448 P.2d 148 (1968); Estate of Slavens,
supra; Matter of Estate of McClelland, 168
Mont. 160, 541 P.2d 780 U975). The cases
make clear that repute means general community reputation, that is, did the parties
consider themselves as married and so act
as to all the world? It relates to the reputation, character and status of the relationship. Welch v. All Persons, 85 Mont. 114,
278 P. 110 (1929).
[3] On the evidence presented here we
have no choice but to affirm. The only
evidence on the issue was given by Judith
and it supports the marriage. Not all the
formalities were followed, but repute, consent and cohabitation were all proven sufficiently by uncontradicted testimony and
presumption of law.
Cases cited in Bowers v. Getter Trucking
Company, Wyo., 514 P.2d 837 (1973) may
have required a different result, but they
were decided before the amendment of
§ 27^-12-408(a), W.S.1977. The statute in
effect at the time of Bowers required a
surviving spouse to have been "regularly
married by a marriage duly solemnized by a
legal ceremony" before benefits could be
given. Our new statute, enacted shortly
after the rendition of this undefinitive opinion, requires only that the parties have been
"legally married." We hold that a common-law marriage valid in the state in
which contracted is valid in Wyoming for
purposes of receipt of benefits under our
Worker's Compensation laws. We find no
error by the trial judge in finding Judith to
be James' legal widow.
The Dependency of the Children
[4] Finally, we review the award of benefits the district court made to the children,
as dependents of the deceased. Tina and
Julie Johnson were children of Judith's previous marriage. Hallie Eayrs was the natural child of Judith and James' marriage in
1969. Although James never formally
adopted Tina and Julie there is evidence of
his support and concern. After the divorce
all three children continued to live in Kalispell. The statute under which the award
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must be based is § 27-12-102, W.S.1977,
which is the definitional section. A "child"
is to include "any individual," except a parent or spouse, who receives "substantially
all" of his or her financial support from the
employee before the injury or death and
who is an unmarried minor or physically or
mentally incapacitated.
The statute
defines a "dependent" as any individual,
except the employee, who is entitled to benefits under the act. There are no Wyoming
cases that further define or interpret these
sections, hence we look to authority from
other states and the language of the statute
itself. The previous decisions from this
court, In re Dragoni, 53 Wyo. 143, 79 P.2d
465 (1938); In re Trent's Claim, 68 Wyo.
146, 231 P.2d 180 (1951); Smith v. National
Tank Company, Wyo., 350 P.2d 539 (1960);
and Heather v. Delta Drilling Co., Wyo., 533
P.2d 1211 (1975), reh. denied, were decided
under the law prior to amendment and that
law was more restrictive. Now, we see the
test as whether the individual benefited
was substantially dependent upon the worker. As it is presumed that an amendment is
made with the intent to change the law and
that the legislature knows the law to be
changed, De Herrera v. Herrera, Wyo., 565
P.2d 479 (1977), reh. denied, we conclude
that the definition of a child was intended
by the legislature to make substantial dependency the test of eligibility and to eliminate the confusion and dispute existing before regarding stepchildren, adoption, legitimacy, lineage, and alienage. Whether any
individual is substantially dependent upon
another is a question of fact not to be
disturbed by this court when substantial
evidence exists to support that finding.
It is true that the claimants bear the
burden of proving the essential elements of
their claim and by the preponderance of the
evidence to establish their entitlement to
award. Pease v. Pacific Power & Light
Company, Wyo., 453 P.2d 887 (1969); Black
Watch Farms v. Baldwin, Wyo., 474 P.2d
297 (1970); Gifford v. Cook-McCann Concrete, Inc., Wyo., 526 P.2d 1197 (1974), and
the rule of liberal construction does not
relieve the burden, Olson v. Federal American Partners, Wyo., 567 P.2d 710 (1977);

Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, supra; In re Hardison, Wyo., 429 P.2d 320 (1967). However,
the worker is entitled to a contrary presumption after the district court makes a
finding that the evidence at the hearing is
sufficient to sustain that burden, Wyoming
State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Department v. Schultz, Wyo., 444
P.2d 313 (1968), and we will not disturb the
determination of the trier of fact if it is
supported by substantial evidence. Olson v.
Federal American Partners, supra; Williams v. Northern Development Co., Wyo.,
425 P.2d 594 (1967); Standard Oil Co. of
Indiana v. Sullivan, 33 Wyo. 223, 237 P. 253
(1925). If the evidence is conflicting this
court will only consider that evidence favorable to the claimant, Richard v. George
Noland Drilling Company, 79 Wyo. 124, 331
P.2d 836 (1958); In re Corey, 65 Wyo. 301,
200 P.2d 333 (1948), and give it every favorable inference that might be reasonably and
fairly drawn from it.
We note that by use of the language in
the amendment the legislature changed the
rule of Heather, supra, where we found a
presumption of dependency. It appears the
legislature intends to define a dependent as
a child and proof of substantial dependency
is required before any award can be made
to such person. WTe also note that use of
the term "substantially all" falls somewhere
between "total" and "partial" dependency
as required by other laws. Padilla v. Industrial Commission, 113 Ariz. 104, 546 P.2d
1135 (1976), vac. 24 Ariz.App. 42, 535 P.2d
634 (1975); De Mendoza v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, 54 Cal.App.3d
820, 127 Cal.Rptr. 173 (1976); 2 Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law, §§ 63:12,
63:13, pp. 11-63—11-76.
Wrebster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971, defines "substantial" as "material," "that
of moment: important, essential." "All" is defined as "the
whole amount or quantity." "Substantially" as used here is an adverb modifying the
noun "all." The case law has^not been
helpful in the resolution of this question.
In Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Utah v.
Board of Review, 118 Utah 619, 223 P.2d
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586, 22 A.L.R.2d 664 (1950) the Utah Supreme Court construed the phrase "ail or
substantially all" as contained in Utah's unemployment compensation law and noted
that neither 25°c nor 75% of the assets of a
corporation comprised "substantially all" of
the assets involved. Unfortunately, on the
facts of this case a quantitative analysis of
the financial support is impossible.
[5] The only evidence on this issue was
given by Judith. She testified that her only
sources of income were from James and
from her Social Security disability benefits
in the sum of $177.80 monthly. She was
not working. James was not working when
he returned to Kalispell but had been employed in Gillette in June and July of that
year. He had also worked for her brotherin-law. Her testimony conflicted for once
she testified he only worked part time or
periodically but that in June and July of
1977 he was working "at least" five or six
days a week; "He worked a lot." At Jim's
he was employed full time. He took the job
to make more money and he promised to
send most of it home when he was paid.
He told her by letter that he "should have a
good check to send you a week from Friday," but he died before he was paid.
James, she testified, contributed financial
support to her and the children, but never
did she state in dollar figures how much he
earned or contributed.
The evidence is far from overwhelming
but the district court concluded that James
did in fact provide substantially all of the
financial support. The amount of Judith's
disability benefits was not large and compared with that figure, James even working
part time could have contributed substantially all of the support. The award provides us with no method to ascertain more,
and with the rules of appeal in mind we
must affirm.
We are mindful of the maxim that Worker's Compensation laws are to be interpreted and applied with reasonable liberality so
that the purposes for which the law was
enacted may be accomplished and where
possible the industry and not the individual
should bear the burdens of accidents suf-

fered. In re McConnell, 45 Wyo. 289, 18
P.2d 629 (1933); In re Gimiin, Wyo., 403
P.2d 178 (1965); Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock,
supra. These ideas formed the policy upon
which the Worker's Compensation laws
were based and comport with its history in
this country and state. A History of American Law, L. M. Friedman. Simon & Schuster, 1973, New York. N. Y., pp. 587-588;
Prosser, Torts, 4th Ed., 1971; § 80, pp.
530-531.
The judgment and order of award is affirmed.

Rudy Patino MUNOZ, a/k/a Rudy Munoz, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
Herb MASCHNER (Warden of Wyoming
State Penitentiary), Honorable John T.
Dixon (Fifth Judicial District Judge,
Wyoming), Mr. J. E. Darrah and Mr. G.
L. Simonton (Park County Prosecuting
Attorneys), the People of the State of
Wyoming, et al., Appellees (Respondents
below).
No. 4973.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
March 6, 1979.
Proceeding was instituted on petition
for postconviction relief. The District
Court, Park County, Harold Joffe, J., dismissed petition, and petitioner appealed.
The Supreme Court held that: (1) procedural irregularity of failing to note value of
stolen property on verdict did not constitute
such an absence of fundamental fairness as
to establish a basis for postconviction relief
where evidence established without a doubt
that petitioner stole property of a given
money value, and (2) question whether
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Court of Oregon in rejecting the rule adopted by this Court in Moore v. Skiles, supra,
pointed up what they felt would be the
incongruous result that would follow in the
situation where a passenger who jointly
owned the car did not know how to drive
it. Suffice it to say that Oregon elects to
follow a rule of law in this particular
contrary to that preferred and adopted by
this Court in the Moore case.
As was stated in the Moore case, "The
question is not solely whether the passenger
actually exercised control over the driver,
but whether the occupant had the right to
exercise such control over the driver, or
that the occupant and the driver * * *
had a right jointly to control its operation."
The "right to exercise * * * control"
is not dependent upon the ability of the
passenger to actually drive the vehicle.
It is not contemplated that a co-owning
passenger in exercising his right to control
will physically wrest the wheel from the
driver. Rather, verbal admonition, suggestions or even outright commands are
the usual methods whereby the co-owning
passenger exercises his right to control.
It is a well-known fact that some of the
better ''back seat" drivers are those who
know little, or nothing, about the actual
driving of the vehicle, but can nonetheless
still offer friendly advice, if not flat commands, to the driver.
In Matheny v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.
et al.f 233 X.C. 681, 63 S.E.2d 368 the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated:
"The fact that the plaintiff was co-owner
and occupant of the automobile, and that it
was being driven at the time by her husband
with her consent for the common benefit
and purpose of both would seem to establish
the essential elements of a joint enterprise."
(Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case
the sole purpose of the ill-fated journey was
to render a benefit to the one plaintiff,
Doloris Parres. We see no good reason
to depart from the rule announced in the
Moore case, and stare decisis dictates that
we must reject the contention of Doloris
Parres and hold that the trial court properly
instructed the jury that the negligence, if

any, oi Lennie Parres was as a matter of
law transferred and imputed to Doloris
Parres.
The judgment is affirmed.
DOYLE. J., dissents.
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In the Matter of the Estate of Archie L.
P E T E R S O N , a / k / a A. L. Peterson,
Deceased.
Elinor Bourne P E T E R S O N ,
Plaintiff in Error,
v.
Elsie L E W I S , formerly Elsie Durham, Laurel A. Peterson, and E. G. Woodbridge, as
Administrator of the Estate of Archie L,
Peterson, a / k / a A. L. Peterson, Deceased,
Defendants In Error.
No. 19283.

Supreme Court of Colorado.
In Department.
Sept. 25. 1061.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 1961.

Proceeding on a petition to determine heirship wherein the party claiming
to be the decedent's widow on the theory
of a common law remarriage alleged heirship in herself. The District Court, Otero
County, William L. Gobin, J., rendered a
judgment adverse to the purported widow, and she brought error. The Supreme
Court, Frantz, J., held that the policy disfavoring divorce and encouraging resumption and continuance of the marital tie
enjoined relaxation in the matter of proof
where the question of common law remarriage was involved.
Reversed with directions.
I. Appeal and Error < ^ I 0 ! 1(1)

Resolution of conflicting evidence is
for trier of facts, not Supreme Court, but
where standards for weighing evidence
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upon which judgment was founded have
been misapplied, reversal must follow.
2. Marriage C=s|

It is policy of law to encourage permanency and continuity of marriage and
to look with disfavor upon its dissolution.
3. Marriage C^50(l)

Policy disfavoring divorce and encouraging resumption and continuance of
the marital tie enjoined relaxation in matter of proof where question of common
law remarriage subsequent to interlocutory divorce decree was involved.

Theodore J. Kuhlman, Charles A. Murdock, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Thulemeyer & Stewart, La Junta, Petersen, Evensen & Evans, Pueblo, for defendants in error, Elsie Lewis and Laurel
A. Peterson.
FRANTZ, Justice.
Is the lawr as exacting and scrupulous
respecting the proof necessary to establish a common law remarriage as it is regarding the proof required to make out a
case of common law marriage? Does the
policy of the lawT disfavoring divorce and
encouraging resumption and continuance
of the marital tie enjoin relaxation in the
matter of proof where the question of remarriage is involved? Affirmance or reversal of the judgment entered in the trial
of this case depends upon the answers to
these questions.
A petition to determine the heirs of Archie L. Peterson, also known as A. L. Peterson, deceased, was filed in the county
court by the sister of the deceased. Her
brother joined in the relief sought. Elinor Bourne Peterson, claiming to be the
widow of the deceased, alleged heirship
in herself. A judgment adverse to Mrs.
Peterson was appealed to the district court,
where her claim was again denied.
In adjudging that Mrs. Peterson failed
to establish that she was the common law
wife of the deceased, the trial court concluded :

"If respondent hopes to establish
her alleged status as a widow, it must
be founded on proof of a common-law
marriage subsequent to December 9,
1955. In Klipfel's Estate v. Klipfel,
41 Colo. 40, 92 P. 124, it was said that
the existence of a common-law marriage may be proven by and presumed
from evidence of cohabitation as husband and wife and general repute. It
was further said, that 'It is necessary
that there be evidence both of cohabitation and reputation before such marriage can be presumed. Proof of one
alone is not sufficient to sustain the presumption.' The court further quoted
with approval from another case: 'It
is not a sojourn, * * * to cohabit
is to live and dwell together, to have
the same habitation, so that where one
lives and dwells there does the other
live and dwell with him.' It further
said that such a marriage contract
must be established by convincing and
positive evidence."
It is not necessary to relate the evidence
in detail. On the issue of the relationship of the Petersons subsequent to the
interlocutory decree of divorce, the evidence is in dispute and in many instances
permits of contrary inferences. There is
substantial evidence showing that the Petersons reunited after the entry of the interlocutory decree, and there is a body of
evidence from which a common law remarriage could be educed. There is admittedly substantial evidence from which
opposite conclusions could be drawn.
[1] Generally this court, in reviewing
the judgment of a trial court, refrains
from doing anything more than ascertaining that such judgment finds support in
the sum of irreconcilable evidence. Resolution of conflicting evidence is the function of the trier of the facts, not oi this
court. Edwards v. Edwards, ,113 Colo.
390, 157 P.2d 616. But where .standards
for weighing the evidence upon which the
judgment was founded have been misapplied, reversal must follow.
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An often quoted statement from Hynes
v. McDermott, 91 N.Y. 431, 43 Am.St.
Rep. 67, is persuasive in our determination, particularly since it represents the
essence oi what this court has said in a
number of decisions involving remarriage
—Githens v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 239 P.
1023, 43 A.L.R. 547; Jordan v. Jordan,
105 Colo. 171, 96 P.2d 13; Shreyer v.
Shreyer, 113 Colo. 219, 155 P.2d 990. It
was there said, ''The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and
not concubinage; legitimacy, and not bastardy."
[2] The law has been resourceful in
developing policies which give stability to
the marriage state and seek to preserve it
as a basic institution in our society. So
important is the marital relation that the
state is said to be an unnamed but vitally
interested party in all actions affecting its
existence. It is the policy of the law
to encourage the permanency and continuity of a marriage and to look with disfavor
upon its dissolution. Githens v. Githens,
supra.
[3] "Remarriage is sufficiently rare in
human affairs to justify regarding it as
sui generis." In re Wagner's Estate, 1960,
393 Pa. 531, 159 A.2d 495, 497. Thus regarded, Justice Bok fittingly distinguished
between a common law marriage and a
common law remarriage in these words:
''These
doctrines
are
familiar
enough. We are, however, not dealing with a first marriage but with a
remarriage following divorce after
twenty years of wedlock. In such
case we think that the law's role of
mere toleration of the common law
relationship should be reversed and
the status of remarriage favored, even
if acquired with common law informality. If the law allows a spouse,
in the generous amount of nine reasons, to establish by divorce that the
marriage was a mistake, it should
be at least equally eager to let both
spouses discover that their divorce
was also a mistake. We regard it bet-

ter to encourage remarriage than to
leave such parties under judicial edict
that they were living sinfully together
for ten years. If children had been
born of this relationship, the wisdom
of regularizing it if possible would
be all the more apparent."
The evidence in this case must be tested and weighed in view of the considers
tions set forth in this opinion. Not havin;
been so treated, we reverse the jucsrmer.
so that the evidence may be considered an<
evaluated in manner consistent with th
doctrines and policies expressed in thi.
opinion.
MOORE and DOYLE, JJ., concur.
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Dorothy GRANT, Plaintiff in Error,
v.
Juanita GWYN, Defendant in Error.
No. 19394.

Supreme Court of Colorado.
In Department.
Sept. 25, 1961.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 1961.

Action for damages for assault wherein defendant filed a counterclaim. The
District Court of the City and County of
Denver, Clifford J. Gobble, J., entered judgment for plaintiff and defendant brought
error. The Supreme Court, Moore, ]-,
held that under a rule of procedure, a
body execution could not issue against defendant who was convicted in a criminal
prosecution for the same wrrong, where matter of such conviction was called to court's
attention prior to issuance of the execution.
Judgment insofar as it authorized execution against body reversed, in all other
respects affirmed.

